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Summary of the MRP portfolio  
Section A   
A systematic review that aimed to explore the Theory of Mind (ToM) measures that 
have been utilised within the recent stroke literature and evaluate the degree to which 
they are appropriate for people that have had a stroke. Thirteen articles and 14 
different ToM assessment tools were eligible for the review. The assessment tools and 
other aspects of the reviewed studies were critically appraised and used to inform the 
extent to which conclusions could be drawn from the stroke literature. It was identified 
that most tasks were appropriate. However, caution was raised with regards to making 
solid conclusions based on the existing literature due to several factors. The review 
concluded with recommendations for prospective studies.  
Section B   
A quantitative study that aimed to examine the use and utility of the Cambridge 
Mindreading Face-Voice Battery (CAM; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006) within 
stroke populations. Group comparisons of CAM performance between 22 stroke 
survivors and 20 age- and education-matched healthy control participants showed no 
significant differences. An exploratory cluster analysis revealed different ToM patterns 
within the stroke sample. These findings were discussed in the context of existing 
neuropsychological and neuroscience literature and theory.  
Section C 
Appendices of supporting material. 
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Abstract 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to infer mental states to self and others. Some 
studies have shown that people with acquired brain injury generally exhibit deficits in 
ToM, although there are exceptions within the literature. These discrepancies may be 
partly attributable to the diverse range of tools used to quantify ToM abilities within 
these clinical groups. The present review aimed to explore the ToM measures that 
have been employed within stroke populations and evaluate the degree to which they 
are appropriate for people that have had a stroke. In consideration of these factors, 
the review included a discussion regarding the extent to which conclusions – with 
respect to the ToM impairment or preservation – could be drawn from the stroke 
literature. A systematic exploration of the literature revealed that besides the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes task, other ToM measures utilised within the literature were 
social-cognitive in nature, most of which were verbally-demanding. Although social-
cognitive ToM tasks are heavily dependent on general cognition, the review identified 
that most tasks included appropriate control stimuli and/or items. However, few studies 
demonstrated the psychometric properties of these tools, which impeded potential 
clinical implications. The review concluded with recommendations for prospective 
studies.  
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Stroke, Acquired Brain Injury, Neuropsychological 
Assessment  
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Introduction 
What is Theory of Mind? 
As defined in Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) influential article on chimpanzee 
behaviour, theory of mind (ToM) refers to one’s ability to attribute mental states to self 
and others. It involves the skill to deduce the mental state of others from perceptual 
cues (e.g., speech content, facial expression) as well as a separate social-cognitive 
component that is responsible for making inferences regarding the mental states 
(thoughts, feelings, etc.) of other people (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Despite 
major theoretical advances in the ToM literature over the last 30 years (Apperly, 2012; 
Slaughter, 2015), its multidimensional nature (Hughes & Leekam, 2004) has continued 
to prove challenging to measure experimentally, particularly beyond childhood. 
Although this complication may be partly attributable to the range of cognitive 
processes known to contribute to ToM (Frith & Frith, 2003; Sabbagh, 2004), the 
systematic differences between the methods by which it is assessed is also likely to 
be partly responsible (Mahy, Moses, & Pfeifer, 2014).  
Beyond being a theoretical construct, the ability to decode (i.e., social-
perceptual ToM) and make mental state inferences (i.e., social-cognitive ToM) enables 
one to predict the impact of their actions on other people, making ToM core to human 
interaction and behaviour (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Although the literature has 
predominately focused on exploring ToM abilities during childhood (Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2006; Doherty, 2009), recent studies have demonstrated its relevance across 
the lifespan. It has been linked to better social functioning in adults, including 
interpersonal communication (Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, Sungu, & Veznedaroglu, 
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2006), participation in activities of daily living (Purcell, Phillips, & Gruber, 2013) and 
engagement in pleasurable activities (Wang et al., 2015). 
 
Theory of Mind in People with Acquired Brain Injury (Stroke) 
Following scientific breakthrough within child developmental psychology research 
during the late 20th century, ToM has been extensively studied across a range of 
clinical populations, including adults with acquired brain injury. Given that people with 
right hemisphere damage (RHD) from stroke were known to present with social and 
communication difficulties (Brownell, Griffin, Winner, Friedman, & Happe, 2000), early 
ToM studies focused on this population; most of which demonstrated that people with 
RHD exhibited deficits across both verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks (Griffin et al., 
2006; Happe, Brownell, & Winner, 1999; Siegal, Carrington, & Radel, 1996; Winner, 
Brownell, Happe, Blum, & Pincus, 1998). However, Surian and Siegal (2001) revealed 
that working memory deficits may account for observed ToM impairments in some 
cases, highlighting the importance of considering other cognitive abilities when 
assessing ToM in populations with acquired brain injury.  
Despite the emphasis on RHD, some lesion studies involving a diverse range 
of neurological populations (e.g., traumatic brain injury) have observed ToM 
impairments in people with more defined lesions, including the right prefrontal regions 
(Channon et al., 2010; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Shamay-Tsoory, 
Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003) and the temporoparietal junction (Apperly, Samson, 
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004). A series of ToM experiments conducted by 
researchers at the University of Birmingham implicated the right inferior frontal gyrus 
in the inhibition of one’s self-perspective (Samson, Houthuys, & Humphreys, 2015; 
5 
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Schurz & Tholen, 2016), whereas the left temporoparietal junction has been linked to 
perspective taking (i.e., facilitating one’s attention to the environmental information that 
is necessary to infer the mental state of another person) (Apperly, Samson, 
Chiavariono, Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2007; Samson, Apperly, & Humphreys, 2007); 
both of which are – to some extent – requirements across a range of ToM tasks 
(Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, Martory, & Annoni, 2011). These neuropsychological 
findings are in line with recent neuroimaging evidence implicating the fronto-parietal-
temporal network in ToM (Carrington & Bailey, 2009), however the picture is 
complicated by the few studies that have found preserved ToM abilities in stroke 
survivors with RHD (Tompkins, Scharp, Fassbinder, Meigh, & Armstrong, 2008) and 
prefrontal lesions (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 2004). Arguably, the evidence 
base taken as a whole is likely to be a reflection of the diverse range of processes 
involved in ToM (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), as well as the variety of tools used to 
measure it within acquired brain injury (viz., stroke) and healthy control populations. 
 
Types of Stroke 
Stroke is a type of brain dysfunction attributable to a disturbance in cerebral blood 
flow. It can occur either through the blockage of blood vessels supplying parts of the 
brain (viz., ischaemia) or bleeding from these blood vessels (viz., haemorrhage). 
Stroke is one of the leading causes of morbidity and premature mortality (Global 
Burden of Disease Study, 2015; Krishnamurthi et al., 2013), thus emphasising the 
importance of developing innovative ways to reduce its individual and societal impact. 
As well as being a major cause of physical disability, stroke typically results in a 
compromise of some form of cognitive functioning, including processes that underpin 
social abilities, otherwise known as social cognition (Hommel et al., 2009; Renjen, 
6 
APPRAISAL OF THEORY OF MIND ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
 
  
Gauba, & Chaudhari, 2015). Improving the way in which social cognition (e.g., ToM) 
is assessed in these populations will have positive clinical implications by enabling 
accurate detection of such deficits.  
 
How is Theory of Mind Measured?  
Since Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed the False-belief paradigm, which 
requires participants to infer the false belief of a protagonist within a narrative, a wide 
range of ToM assessment tools have been constructed within the field of 
developmental psychology (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Doherty, 2009). A lot of these 
tasks have been adapted for use within specific adult populations, including those that 
have experienced stroke (Apperly, Humphreys, & Samson, 2009).  
Social-cognitive ToM tasks are the most widely used ToM tools in populations 
with acquired brain injury (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010). These tasks can 
be presented within a first-order format, whereby participants are instructed to infer 
the knowledge, belief, desire, or intention of a protagonist within a visually and/or 
verbally presented scenario (e.g., During a race between Alexa and Isaiah, Alexa 
tripped over a rock. What is going through Alexa’s mind?). There are also second-
order social-cognitive ToM tasks, which tap into one’s capacity to infer a protagonist’s 
beliefs regarding a deuteragonist’s mental state (e.g., where does Alexa think Hanne 
will first look for her lunch?). These social-cognitive ToM tasks are typically presented 
in the form of the previously described False-belief paradigm (Apperly, 2011), which 
offers researchers the advantage of being able to clearly distinguish between a 
person’s true belief representation (i.e., what they know) and their ability to 
conceptualise the inaccurate belief of protagonists. 
7 
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An alternative method to assessing social-cognitive ToM involves simply asking 
a person to infer the mental state of a protagonist based on the contents of a narrative 
presented to them (e.g., Daniel told Matthew that he would be with him in 5 minutes, 
when in fact he was 30 minutes away. Why did Daniel say this?). A similar approach 
to assessing ToM features in the widely-used Faux Pas task (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & 
Knight, 1998). With regards to the Faux Pas task, participants are required to detect 
whether a protagonist within the presented narrative has said something inappropriate, 
which is typically followed by questions tapping into their ability to infer the mental 
states of the protagonists (speaker or receiver). A recent meta-analysis revealed that 
populations with acquired brain injury showed moderate deficits in first- and second-
order social-cognitive ToM tasks, whereas severe deficits were observed in their Faux 
Pas performance (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010), emphasising the multi-
faceted nature of the ToM construct, or at the very least, the differences between the 
tools used to quantify it.  
Since its development, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET; Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, Robertson, 1997) – a social-perceptual measure of ToM 
based on one’s ability to decode the mental state of protagonists based on pictures of 
their eye region – has occasionally been employed within populations with acquired 
brain injury (Havet-Thomassin, Allain, Etcharry-Bouyx, & Le Gall, 2006; Milders, 
Fuchs, & Crawford, 2003). 
Considering the importance of developing neuropsychological assessment 
tools that can more accurately detect social impairment within stroke populations 
(Channon & Crawford, 2010), alongside the fact that there are a myriad of ToM 
measures that have been adapted for use within neurological populations, and more 
specifically, stroke survivors, it is surprising that there has yet to be a qualitative review 
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of studies exploring ToM abilities in stroke survivors, with a specific focus on the tools 
used to derive the findings. The present review will aim to contribute to the literature 
by filling this gap and where available, there will be reference to the psychometric 
properties of the ToM measures used.  
 
Aims of the Review 
The present review will appraise ToM measures and associated studies within the 
existing stroke literature.  
The literature review will address two sub-questions, namely: 
a) What measures have been used to assess ToM in stroke populations and to 
what extent are they appropriate for use within this clinical group?  
b) What conclusions can be drawn from the literature? 
  
Due to the variance across the literature with regards to stroke participant population 
and design, the use of a critical appraisal tool would offer minimal comparison between 
eligible studies, thus it was decided that they would not be employed within the present 
review.  
Methodology 
Three electronic databases (PsycINFO, Web of Science and MEDLINE) were 
searched from their earliest entries to December 2016 using keywords relevant to 
stroke and ToM, which were as follows: stroke OR “cerebrovascular disorder*” OR 
“cerebrovascular accident” OR haemorrhagic OR hemorrhagic and “theory of mind” 
OR “social cogniti*” OR empathy OR “emotion* recogni*” OR mentali*. As Martin-
9 
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Rodriguez and Leon-Carrion (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of studies 
investigating ToM deficits in populations with acquired brain injury up to June 2008, it 
was decided that the present review will exclude articles published prior to this month.  
 
For the purpose of the review, ToM will be defined as the capacity to form direct 
representations of other people’s mental state and/or to use these representations to 
understand, predict and judge utterances and behaviour (Brownell & Martino, 1998). 
This definition of ToM rules out basic visual perspective-taking tasks, which have 
distinct cognitive features to belief reasoning tasks, such as automaticity (Back & 
Apperly, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley-Scott, 2010). In 
addition to the social-cognitive component of ToM that involves inferring the thoughts, 
beliefs, and intentions of others, the present review will also include tasks tapping into 
the decoding perceptual-based capacities, known as social-perceptual ToM (Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Social-perceptual ToM tasks that require participants to 
attribute complex affective mental states that imply cognitive attribution (e.g., surprise) 
will be included. However, measures that solely assess participants’ ability to 
recognise basic or situational-based emotions from facial stimuli, including happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear and disgust, will be excluded. Basic emotion recognition is 
thought to involve a different process to inferring an affective mental state (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), thus forming the basis for this 
omission.  
 
Measures that exclusively assess the capacity of detecting irony or a social 
transgression (faux pas), moral judgment, processing humour, understanding 
metaphors or simple problem-solving tasks that do not explicitly force participants to 
10 
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make direct inferences regarding mental states, were also not included within the 
present review. Considering the high density of contextual information provided within 
such measures, successful performance might rely on an intact social script or the 
utilisation of superficial problem-solving strategies, rather than one’s ability to attribute 
accurate mental states to others (Apperly, 2011). As it was intended for clinical 
implications of ToM assessment to be drawn from the review, studies that did not 
directly compare the performance of stroke and healthy control samples on eligible 
ToM measures were excluded.   
 
Abstracts and full articles were screened using inclusion/exclusion criteria (see Figure 
1 for a flow chart): 
 
• Article must be published in English. 
• Paper must describe empirical and peer-reviewed research. 
• At least one explicit ToM measure must be administered within the study (only 
tasks that meet inclusion criteria will be discussed). 
• There must be a stroke survivor sample or participant whose performance on 
an eligible ToM task is compared against healthy controls. 
• It must not involve participants under 18 years old. 
• Articles must be published on or after June 2008.  
  
The reference lists of all eligible articles and relevant reviews were manually inspected 
for the purpose of identifying additional eligible papers. If it was suspected that a study 
and associated ToM measure would be eligible for the present review, but the article 
lacked the details to include it (e.g., there was a control group but the comparison with 
11 
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the stroke sample was not made explicit within the article), there was an attempt made 
to contact the author/s directly for further information. ToM measures used in the 
included studies were recorded and where possible, their original references were 
sought for further information.  
 
Figure 1. A flowchart for the search strategy used  
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Additional records identified 
through other sources 
(n = 3) 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n = 208) 
Records screened 
(n = 208) 
Records excluded 
(n = 164) 
 
See above for criteria 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n = 44) 
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons 
(n = 31) 
Studies included in 
qualitative synthesis  
(n = 13) 
 
Unique measures of 
Theory of Mind included 
in qualitative synthesis 
(n = 14) 
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Results 
 
See Tables 1, 2, and 3 for a list of the identified ToM measures, design characteristics of the eligible studies, and brief summaries of 
the associated studies, respectively.   
 
Table 1 
Properties of the Reviewed Theory of Mind Measures 
 
 
  Presentation  Questions 
Participants with Right Hemisphere Damage 
 
Study Author Year Measure 
Used 
Stories Pictures Video  
 
ToM Control 
         
Balaban et al. 2016 aTOMia 
battery 
False belief: 2 
Second-order 
false-belief: 1 
Knowledge gaps: 2 
Instruction: 4 
Faux pas: 2 
Surprise: 2 
Empathy: 2 
Cartoon: 2 - False belief: 2 
Second-order false-
belief: 2 
Knowledge gaps: 4 
Instruction: 8 
Faux pas: 4 
Surprise: 4 
Empathy: 6 
Cartoon: 2 
False belief: 2 
Second-order false-
belief: 4 
Knowledge gaps: 2 
Instruction: 0 
Faux pas: 2 
Surprise: 2 
Empathy: 2 
Cartoon: 2 
 
Besharati et al. 
 
2016 
 
ToM stories 
 
20 (4 controls) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
16 
 
4 
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Champagne-
Lavau & 
Joannette 
 
2009 
 
ToM task 
 
20 
 
- 
 
- 
 
20 
 
40 
        
 
Leigh et al. 
 
2013 
 
Affective 
Empathy 
Task 
 
1 
 
- 
 
4 
 
18 
 
NR 
 
Weed et al. 
(see Abell et al., 
2000) 
 
2010 
 
Animations 
task 
 
- 
  
10 (2 practice) 
 
8 
 
2 
 
Participants with Right and Left Hemisphere Damage 
 
Martory et al. 
 
2015 
 
GeSoCS 
 
Social cognition: 5 
 
 
 
 
Mind in the Eyes: 
10 
ToM cartoons: 5 
 
 
- 
 
Social cognition: 5 
Mind in the eyes: 10 
ToM cartoons: 5 
 
Social cognition: NR 
ToM cartoons: 1 
 
 
Yeh & Tsai 
 
2014 
 
FPT 
(Chinese) 
 
10 
 
- 
 
- 
 
20 
 
- 
 
Yeh & Tsai 
 
2014 
 
Picture task 
 
- 
 
10 
 
- 
 
10 
 
- 
 
Participants with Discrete Lesions 
        
Couto et al. (see 
Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001) 
2013 RMET - 36 - 36 - 
        
Gerschcovich et 
al. (see Baron-
2011 RMET - 36 - 36 - 
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Cohen et al., 
2001) 
        
Kemp et al. (see 
Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001) 
2013 RMET 
(French) 
- 36 - 36 - 
 
Kemp et al. (see 
Ehrle et al., 2011) 
 
2013 
 
FBT 
 
19 (11 first order, 8 
second order) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
19 (11 first order, 8 
second order) 
 
38 (22 first order, 16 
second order) 
 
Kemp et al.  
 
2013 
 
FPT 
(French) 
 
20 (10 faux pas) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
30 
 
40 (20 faux pas) 
        
Sedeno et al. 
(see Baron-
Cohen et al., 
2001) 
2016 RMET - 36 - 36 - 
        
Wilkos et al. (see 
Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001) 
2015 RMET - 36 - 36 - 
 
 
Xi et al. (see Zhu 
et al., 2007) 
 
 
2013 
 
 
FPT 
(Chinese) 
 
 
10 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
20 
 
 
10 
 
 
Xi et al. (see 
Wang et al., 
2008) 
 
2013 
 
RMET 
(Chinese) 
 
- 
 
34 
 
- 
 
34 
 
34 
         
Note. NR = not reported; N/A = not applicable; ToM = Theory of Mind; FPT = Faux Pas task; FBT = False-belief task; RMET = Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
task; Geneva Social Cognition Scale. 
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Table 2 
Design Characteristics of the Reviewed Studies 
   Stroke sample  Control sample  
 
Authors 
 
Year 
 
Country 
 
Size 
(n) 
 
Onset 
 
Lesion site 
 
Aphasia 
excluded  
Psychiatric 
History 
excluded  
 
 
 
Size  
(n) 
 
Age-
matched 
 
Education-
matched 
Participants with Right Hemisphere Damage 
 
Balaban et al. 
 
2016 
 
Israel 
 
22a 
 
3 – 60 
months 
 
RHD  
 
Y 
 
NR 
  
14 
 
NR 
 
Y 
            
Besharati et al. 2016 UK 30 Mdn = 8.5  RHD  Y Y  15 Y Y 
            
Champagne-Lavau 
& Joannette 
2009 Canada 15 1 – 4 
months 
RHD  NR Y  15 Y Y 
            
Leigh et al. 2013 USA 27 “acute” RHD N N  24 Y Y 
            
Weed et al. 2010 Denmark 11 1 – 7 
months 
RHD N N  10 NR Y 
 
Participants with Right and Left Hemisphere Damage 
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Martory et al. 2015 Switzerland 31 10-21 
days 
LHD, RHD and bilateral Y Y  52 NR NR 
            
Yeh & Tsai 2014 China 34 NR RHD & LHD Y Y  40 Y Y 
Participants with Discrete Lesions 
Couto et al. 2013 Argentina 2 GG: 18 
months 
 
NF: 12 
months 
GG: focal insular cortex 
lesion 
NF: subcortical stroke 
affecting connections of the 
insular cortex with 
frontotemporal areas 
N/A N/A  10 GG: Y 
NF: Y 
GG: Y 
NF: N 
 
Gerschcovich et al. 
 
2011 
 
Argentina 
 
1 
 
3 months 
 
Bilateral cerebellar 
infarction 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
  
21 
 
Y 
 
Y 
            
Kemp et al. 2013 France 1 46 months Left caudate nucleus N/A N/A  12 Y Y 
            
Sedeno et al. 2016 Argentina 4 ≥ 6 
months 
Frontoinsular NR NR  12 Y N 
            
Wilkos et al. 2015 Poland 8 3 weeks Unilateral thalamic 
infarction 
NR Y  11 NR NR 
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Xi et al. 
 
2013 
 
China 
 
19 
 
M = 36.42 
days  
SD = 8.91 
 
Unilateral temporal lobe 
cerebral infarction 
 
NR 
 
Y 
  
20 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Note. n= number; Y = yes; N = no; NR = not reported; N/A = not applicable; RHD = right hemispheric damage; LHD = left hemispheric damage; GG & NF = 
stroke patients within Couto et al.’s (2013) study; Mdn = Median; M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation. 
aBalaban et al.’s (2016) study also included three participants with acquired brain injury that was not due to stroke. 
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Table 3 
Main Findings of the Reviewed Studies 
Authors Year Measure Findings 
 
Participants with Right Hemisphere Damage 
 
Balaban et al. 
 
2016 
 
aTOMia battery 
 
14 out of 22 stroke patients had significantly lower total scores on the battery than the education-
matched control group. The group analysis (which also included three patients with right 
hemispheric damage from other neurological pathologies) revealed that the acquired brain injury 
sample performed poorer than the healthy control sample on five out of eight ToM categories: 
knowledge gaps, instruction, faux pas, empathy (first and second order) and the mental state 
cartoon tasks, whereas there were no differences observed in false belief (first and second-order) 
and surprise subtasks. 
 
Besharati et al. 
 
2016 
 
Theory of Mind stories 
 
They found that a stroke patient sub-group (right hemispheric damage: presenting with 
anosognosia for hemiplegia) performed poorer than the two control groups (healthy and stroke 
patients with right hemispheric damage and contralateral hemiplegia, but without anosognosia). 
Further analysis revealed that the stroke patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia exhibited a 
deficit in third-person perspective (difference between their performance on first-person and third-
person ToM tasks) in comparison to the hemiplegic stroke patients without anosognosia and 
healthy control sample. 
 
Champagne-
Lavau  
& Joannette 
 
2009 
 
Theory of mind task 
 
Stroke survivors performed poorer than the healthy control sample across the first- and second-
order theory of mind items, however this pattern was also observed within the inferential 
processing and comprehension questions and measures of pragmatic understanding used within 
the study. A hierarchical cluster analysis revealed a co-occurrence of theory of mind and pragmatic 
impairments and/or executive dysfunction in different stroke sub-groups. 
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Leigh et al. 2013 Affective Empathy Task 14 out of 27 stroke patients met criteria for impaired affective theory of mind determined from the 
performance of the healthy control group. Nine of the 14 patients found to have a theory of mind 
impairment had lesions to one or more brain regions implicated in the affective theory of mind 
network: right prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, 
temporal pole and amygdala. A very strong association between the presence of a lesion in one 
or more of these regions of interest and impairments on the ToM task was identified, whilst the 
only significant independent associations were between compromised affective ToM and an infarct 
in the temporal pole or in the anterior insula. 
 
Weed et al. 
 
2010 
 
Animations task (Abell 
et al., 2000) 
 
No significant difference in the extent to which the stroke survivors and an education-matched 
control group explicitly referenced specific mental states when describing animations. However, a 
second coding procedure which accounted for implicit ToM revealed poorer performance in the 
stroke samplea. 
 
Participants with Right and Left Hemisphere Damage 
 
Martory et al. 
 
2015 
 
GeSoCS 
 
Stroke patients with right, left and bilateral hemispheric cerebrovascular accident performed 
poorer than the healthy control sample across all ToM measures (social cognition, Mind in the 
Eyes and cartoons) as well as the items assessing general inferential abilities and executive 
functioning. Post-hoc analyses revealed that stroke patients with right cerebrovascular accident 
performed poorer on the cartoons and Mind in the Eyes subtasks as well as one executive function 
measure. On the other hand, the left cerebrovascular accident group performed significantly 
poorer than controls in the social cognition and cartoon sub-tasks as well as the general inference 
task and one measure of executive functioning. Patients with bilateral cerebrovascular accident 
were significantly impaired across all three theory of mind tasks, the general inference task and 
the two executive function measures.  
 
Yeh & Tsai 
 
2009 
 
Chinese version of the 
Faux Pas task 
 
Stroke patients with right or left hemispheric damage performed poorer than the control group on 
both cognitive and affective theory of mind items. This difference retained significance even when 
general cognition was accounted for within the analysis. 
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Yeh & Tsai 
 
2009 
 
Picture task 
 
Stroke patients with right or left hemispheric damage performed poorer than the healthy control 
group on both cognitive and affective theory of mind items. A post-hoc analysis indicated that the 
stroke sample with right hemispheric damage performed significantly poorer than the stroke group 
with left hemispheric damage on the cognitive items, but not on the affective component. The 
differences identified remained significant even when general cognition was accounted for within 
the analysis. 
Participants with Discrete Lesions 
 
Kemp et al. 
 
2013 
 
French version of the 
Faux-Pas Test 
 
Stroke patient with left caudate nucleus damage, MVG performed poorer than the control group 
on the ToM items excluding one, which assessed second-order belief reasoning. 
 
Kemp et al. 
 
2013 
 
First- and Second-
Order False-Beliefs 
Task (Ehrle et al., 2011) 
 
Stroke patient with left caudate nucleus damage, MVG did not significantly differ from age- and 
education-level matched controls in both first- and second-order false beliefs task performance. 
 
Kemp et al. 
 
2013 
 
French version of the 
Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test 
 
Stroke patient with left caudate nucleus damage, scored significantly less than the controls. 
 
Couto et al. 
 
2013 
 
Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001) 
 
No significant differences between G.G. (focal insular cortex lesion following stroke) and N.F. 
(subcortical stroke affecting connections of the insular cortex with frontotemporal areas) and the 
healthy control sample. 
 
Gerschcovich     
et al. 
 
2011 
 
Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001) 
 
Stroke survivor with bilateral cerebellar infarction performed below 7 standard deviations of the 
mean healthy control sample’s performance. 
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Sedeno et al. 2016 Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001) 
A Mann-Whitney U test using data provided by the authors identified that there were no significant 
differences between the performance of the stroke patients with frontoinsular lesions and the 
healthy control sample (see Appendix A). 
 
Wilkos et al. 
 
2015 
 
Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001) 
 
Stroke patients with unilateral thalamic infarction performed poorer than the control group. 
 
 
Xi et al. 
 
 
2013 
 
Chinese version of the 
Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes test (Wang et al., 
2008) 
 
Stroke patients with temporal lobe cerebral infarction performed poorer than the control group on 
the theory of mind task. Additionally, there were no significant differences between the 
performance of the stroke and healthy control group on the gender discrimination (control) task. 
 
Xi et al. 
 
2013 
 
Recognition of Faux 
Pas task (Zhu et al., 
2007) 
 
Despite no group performance differences on the story comprehension control item or faux pas 
detection, stroke patients with temporal lobe infarction performed poorer than the healthy control 
group on the questions that assessed cognitive theory of mind 
Note. aThe additional coding procedure was not discussed within the review as it did not meet the inclusion criteria.
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Literature Review 
For the purposes of structuring the present review and enabling meaningful between-
study comparisons, investigations will be organised with regards to the stroke 
population within which ToM was explored, including those that have included stroke 
survivors broadly described as having right hemisphere damage (RHD), studies that 
involved one or more participants with clearly defined lesions (e.g., cerebellar damage) 
and, less precise investigations that comprised those with right and left hemisphere 
damage (LHD).   
 
Right Hemisphere Damage 
In line with the historical literature (see Introduction), a significant proportion of studies 
(n = 5) within the present review solely included stroke survivors with the broad label 
of RHD.  
 
What ToM tasks were used?  
All the ToM tasks used in these investigations were social-cognitive in nature, four of 
which were predominantly verbally-based (Balaban, Friedmann, & Ziv, 2016; 
Besharati et al., 2016; Champagne-Lavau and Joanette, 2009; Leigh et al., 2013). 
However, Leigh et al.’s ToM task involved a partly non-verbal (video with audio) 
component and Balaban et al.’s ToM battery consisted of one non-verbal subtask 
(Cartoons), which required participants to infer the mental state of protagonists 
depicted within an animated picture. The remaining study conducted by Weed, 
McGregor, Nielsen, Roepstorff, and Frith (2010) administered a non-verbal ToM task, 
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which comprised eight animations selected from the clips used within Abell, Happe 
and Frith’s (2000) study, to 11 participants with RHD and 10 education-matched 
healthy controls. The chosen dynamic animations consisted of two triangles, half of 
which were ‘Theory of Mind’ animations that showed one triangle seemingly reacting 
to the mental state of the other triangle, whereas this was not the case for the 
remaining animations, within which the triangles did not interact with one another 
(‘Random’ animations). After each randomised trial, participants indicated whether 
they felt there was a story in the animation, and were subsequently instructed to 
describe it. The comments generated by the latter question were blindly rated – on the 
extent to which a (mental state) intention had been inferred – by one of the researchers 
and two independent raters, all of whom followed Abell et al.’s coding framework, 
resulting in a moderate Cohen’s kappa coefficient of 0.488. 
With regards to the verbal ToM tasks, both Champagne-Lavau and Joanette’s 
(2009) and Besharati et al.’s (2016) study assessed participants on tasks that were 
presented in the form of a narrative involving two protagonists and first- and second- 
order questions. However, Champagne-Lavau and Joanette’s ToM task was 
administered to 15 people with RHD and 15 age- and education-matched controls in 
the form of a false-belief paradigm, whereas Besharati et al.’s investigation included 
20 stories – four of which were controls – that tapped into ToM through self-referential 
(e.g., how do you feel about your friend breaking their leg?) and the typical, third-
person perspective questions. Furthermore, unlike the False-belief task in 
Champagne-Lavau and Joanette’s study which solely explored one’s ability to infer 
beliefs, Besharati et al.’s ToM task consisted of an equal division of items that tapped 
into cognitive (e.g., Claire is trying not to hurt Eddie’s feelings) and affective-based 
(e.g., Jessica feels relieved that she did not kill her friend’s cat) mental inferences, 
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thus incorporating these two dissociable aspects of social-cognitive ToM (Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005; Kalbe et al., 2010).  
On the other hand, Leigh et al. (2013) developed a social-cognitive ToM task, 
known as the Affective Empathy Task, which exclusively tapped into participants’ 
ability to infer affective mental state. It consisted of sixteen questions that assessed 
participants’ ability to attribute affective mental states to protagonists in four videos – 
depicting a social scenario – and two questions linked to a verbally-presented 
narrative. Alongside administering the task to patients with acute ischaemic right 
hemisphere stroke within 24 hours of their hospital admission, a neurologically-intact 
sample of 24 patients that had experienced a transient ischaemic attack were recruited 
as the healthy control sample.  
Lastly, Balaban et al. (2016) devised a tool consisting of eight ToM tasks, which 
was referred to as the aTOMia battery. It comprised first-order false-belief, second-
order false-belief, knowledge gaps1, instruction1, Faux Pas, surprise1, empathy1, and 
cartoon2 tasks. Five out of the eight ToM categories involved stimuli (e.g., story) from 
an established ToM measure and a second story, which was specifically created by 
the authors to match the first scenario with respect to narrative length and complexity. 
Although this battery offers a broad assessment of ToM, similar to the other RHD 
studies, it relies on social-cognitive ToM, which has been found to be distinct from the 
social-perceptual component (Ahmed & Miller, 2011). Furthermore, as highlighted by 
Apperly (2011), poor performance on social-cognitive tasks in people with acquired 
brain injury may be attributable to a range of factors, thus the challenge for researchers 
                                                          
1 Verbal theory of mind task that required participants to infer the belief and/or intention of a protagonist 
within a presented narrative. 
2 Non-verbal theory of mind task that required participants to infer the intention of an animated protagonist 
within a picture.  
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is to pinpoint the aetiology and/or account for extraneous variables that may influence 
performance on these tasks, including working memory (Stone et al., 1998) and 
language comprehension (Surian & Siegal, 2001).   
The ToM tasks used in the RHD studies were somewhat responsive to this 
potent limitation of social-cognitive ToM tasks when applied to neurological population 
through the inclusion of control items. For the narrative-based measures (Balaban et 
al., 2016; Besharati et al., 2016; Champagne-Lavau & Joanette, 2009; Leigh et al., 
2013), this involved a set of questions that assessed participants’ general 
comprehension and memory, however Champagne-Lavau and Joanette and 
Besharati et al. also assessed general inferential abilities, which if impaired, would 
undoubtedly affect domain-specific ToM abilities (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 
2005). While Champagne-Lavau and Joanette tapped into this domain-general ability 
by including non-mental state inference questions alongside the false-belief and 
comprehension questions, Besharati et al.’s task comprised four control narratives – 
that required (non-mental) general inferences to reach an accurate conclusion. On the 
other hand, owing to its non-verbal nature, Weed et al. (2010) instead ensured 
participants understood the task instructions via two practice trials. The inclusion of 
non-ToM (Random) animations enabled the researchers to disentangle the domain-
general demands of the task – considering the ToM and Random conditions were 
similar – and ability of participants to infer mental states within the ToM condition. This 
non-verbal task, alongside the Affective Empathy Task (Leigh et al.) involved dynamic 
stimuli (although arguably, inferring the mental state of shapes may have little 
relevance to interpersonal challenges in real-world situations), whilst the other tasks 
required participants to engage in artificial narratives. Considering the abundant 
presence of information normally available within the natural environment (e.g., 
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motion, facial expressions), the other reviewed social-cognitive tasks may lack 
ecological validity (Turkstra, 2008). 
 
Sampling Comparisons.  
With regards to samples, two of these studies (Besharati et al., 2016; Leigh et al., 
2013) involved stroke patients at the acute stage of their recovery, whereas the stroke 
survivors in the remaining studies were at least one month post-onset, although this 
ranged up to 60 months in Balaban et al.’s (2016) investigation. It is plausible that ToM 
abilities – as is the case with other aspects of cognition – will improve with time 
following stroke (Hochstenbach, den Otter, & Mulder, 2003), which might imply that 
comparisons between studies involving stroke patients in the acute stage and stroke 
survivors further along their rehabilitation may be misleading, unless clearly 
highlighted.  
Besides Weed et al.’s (2010) study, the remaining investigations explicitly 
matched the stroke and healthy control participants by age, although the paper 
highlighted that the median age for both groups was 65 years. This is an important 
design feature considering the well documented effect of older age on social-cognitive 
ToM task performance (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). Education was 
another factor that was matched in all studies except one (Besharati et al., 2016). 
There is some evidence to suggest education (Oishi et al., 2014; Yildirim et al., 2011) 
and premorbid intelligence (Charlton, Barrick, Markus, & Morris, 2009) influences 
performance on social-cognitive ToM tasks, emphasising the importance of 
accounting for it within sampling procedures. There was less attention paid to the 
exclusion criteria, with three studies not explicitly excluding stroke and healthy control 
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participants with a psychiatric history (Balaban et al., 2016; Leigh et al., 2013; Weed 
et al., 2010), which is known to influence ToM capacity (Mitchell & Young, 2016; 
Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & van Engeland, 2007). Also, considering most of the 
tasks within the RHD studies relied on verbal processing, aphasia is another 
noteworthy factor in apparent ToM performance. Most of the studies did not exclude 
stroke survivors with aphasia (Champagne-Lavau & Joanette, 2009; Leigh et al., 2013; 
Weed et al., 2010), however this is less problematic for the latter study which utilised 
a non-verbal ToM task. Furthermore, the inclusion of control items within the verbal 
ToM tasks may have identified participants that were unable to successfully complete 
ToM items due to impaired verbal comprehension, which minimises the potential bias 
from this domain-general ability. 
 
What were the findings?  
As all the reviewed RHD investigations were cross-sectional studies, between-group 
comparisons were generally conducted, except in Leigh et al.’s (2013) study which 
identified a cut-off score of a 30% error rate using the performance of the control group. 
Using this criterion, they found 14 out of 27 (51.9%) stroke patients were impaired on 
the ToM task. Balaban et al. (2016) conducted a between-group analysis alongside 
an individual analysis using Crawford and Howell’s (1998) approach to single-case 
comparisons, which revealed 14 out of 22 stroke survivors (63.6%) had significantly 
lower total scores on the aTOMia battery than the education-matched control group. 
It is plausible that the higher proportion identified within Balaban et al.’s study in 
comparison to Leigh et al. is attributable to the extensive nature of the aTOMia battery, 
which increases its likelihood to detect ToM impairment in one or more of its subtasks. 
In line with this position, the group analysis revealed that the acquired brain injury 
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sample performed poorer than the healthy control sample on five out of eight ToM 
categories: knowledge gaps, instruction, faux pas, empathy and the mental state 
cartoon tasks, whereas there were no significant between-group differences observed 
in first- and second-order false belief and surprise subtasks. 
Balaban et al.’s (2016) findings of non-significant between-group differences in 
the false-belief tasks contrasts with Champagne-Lavau and Joanette’s (2009) and 
Besharati et al.’s (2016) study, which demonstrated that stroke survivors performed 
poorer than the healthy control sample across first- and second-order ToM items. 
However, in the case of Champagne-Lavau and Joanette’s investigation, a 
hierarchical cluster analysis conducted within the study revealed a co-occurrence of 
pragmatic impairments and/or executive dysfunction in stroke survivors with ToM 
deficits, suggesting that the observed ToM impairments may have been accounted for 
by these domain-general abilities. This is consistent with Weed et al.’s3 (2010) 
investigation, whose ToM task had limited, if any pragmatic demands due to its 
nonverbal nature, which revealed no significant differences in the extent to which the 
stroke and education-matched control groups explicitly referenced specific mental 
states when describing the animations within the ToM condition. However, as there 
were no measures of pragmatic understanding within Balaban et al.’s investigation, 
this hypothetical explanation – that suggests apparent ToM deficits in RHD may be a 
function of impairment in pragmatic understanding – cannot be confirmed. 
Nevertheless, this position is supported by previous studies in RHD samples (Siegal 
et al., 1996; Surian & Siegal, 2001).  
                                                          
3 Weed et al. (2010) conducted a second coding procedure in response to the non-significant between-group 
comparisons, however the task in this form (implicit ToM) did not meet inclusion within the present review.  
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As Besharati et al. (2016) subdivided their stroke sample into those with and 
without anosognosia for hemiplegia, further analysis revealed that stroke survivors 
with anosognosia had a specific impairment in self-referential ToM, suggesting that 
the ability to infer mental states to self and others may be underpinned by separate 
mechanisms. As the other RHD studies exclusively assessed ToM via the third-
person, between-study comparisons with regards to this factor could not be made, 
although there is some evidence from a relatively recent neuroimaging study in 
support of this ToM dissociation (Otsuka, Osaka, Yaoi, & Osaka, 2011).  
 
Left and Right Hemisphere Damage  
Two studies involved participants that had experienced a left or right cerebrovascular 
accident (Martory et al., 2015; Yeh & Tsai, 2014), although the former also included 
those with bilateral stroke.  
 
What ToM tasks were used?  
While Martory et al. (2015) developed a novel social cognition battery, known as the 
Geneva Social Cognition Scale (GeSoCS), Yeh and Tsai (2014) used an adapted 
version of the widely used social-cognitive ToM measure, the Faux Pas task and a 10-
picture item social-cognitive ToM measure, five of which assessed cognitive reasoning 
while the remaining tapped into affective ToM. Unlike the original Faux Pas task (Stone 
et al., 1998), Yeh and Tsai’s version consisted of 10 rather than 20 stories, all of which 
consisted of a scenario whereby a protagonist made a social transgression (faux pas). 
It included associated ToM items that tapped into first-order cognitive (e.g., “what is 
the person thinking?”) and affective reasoning (e.g., “what is the person feeling?”). 
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Similarly, the nonverbal picture task – which was used in a previous study (Yeh et al., 
2010) – tapped into the dissociable cognitive and affective ToM component, although 
examined this through asking participants to infer the intention of a protagonist within 
animated pictures presented to them.  
On the other hand, the GeSoCS consisted of six separate tasks, 3 of which 
assessed ToM. The first task (social cognition) required participants to make 
inferences based on four presented stories from established verbal social-cognitive 
ToM measures, including the Faux Pas task (Stone et al., 1998). The second ToM 
measure comprised ten photographs from the revised RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001), which tapped into social-perceptual ToM, whereas the third ToM task consisted 
of five picture stories that required participants to infer first- and second-order false 
beliefs and one control story without ToM-specific inferential processing demands. 
While Martory et al. (2015) included some second-order questions, Yeh and Tsai’s 
(2014) Faux Pas and Picture tasks lacked second-order items, which is likely to reduce 
their capacity to identify stroke survivors with mild to moderate ToM deficits (Martin-
Rodriquez & Leon-Carrion, 2010). However, to the testament of the adapted tasks 
used in Yeh and Tsai’s study, the authors highlighted strong reliability properties in 
both the Faux Pas (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 and re-test reliability of 0.89) and Picture 
tasks (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93 and re-test reliability of 0.90).  
There was an apparent omission of control items within both ToM tasks 
administered within Yeh and Tsai’s (2014) study. Particularly given that Faux Pas 
narratives consist of complex social situations that may require more than ToM 
capacities (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010), items to ensure story 
comprehension are paramount. The lack of this feature limits the extent to which 
domain-general abilities (e.g., working memory) can be ruled out as an explanation for 
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possible between-group differences. In contrast, the GeSoCS consisted of control 
items to assess for linguistic comprehension. Also, alongside the ToM tasks, the 
GeSoCS consisted of three subtests that tapped into participants’ ability to make 
general inferences and executive functioning. Considering the strong association 
between these domain-general abilities and ToM (Aboulafia-Brakha et al., 2011; 
Champagne-Lavau & Joanette, 2009), the inclusion of these items within the GeSoCS 
equips it with the valuable property of being able to rule them out as explanations for 
ToM deficits that may be observed within stroke populations.  
  
Sampling Comparisons.  
Yeh and Tsai (2014) matched 34 stroke and 40 healthy control participants according 
to age and education, whereas there was a clear age difference between the 31 stroke 
survivors and 52 healthy controls in Martory et al.’s (2015) study. However, as there 
were no explicit group comparisons between age or education in Martory et al.’s 
investigation, this cannot be confirmed. Given that Martory et al. aimed to develop a 
clinical tool, unlike Yeh and Tsai, they did not exclude stroke patients with aphasia. It 
is plausible that this may have confounded their findings, particularly with respect to 
the LHD sample, some of whom had aphasia according to the authors. Although, both 
studies excluded people with psychiatric history, minimising the source of ToM-specific 
bias from inclusion of people with severe and enduring mental health problems. As the 
two studies recruited people who had a stroke from acute wards, it is likely that the 
stroke samples only included people with acute stroke (although this was not made 
explicit within Yeh and Tsai’s article), thus offering better scope for between-study 
comparisons than in the RHD literature which varied considerably with regards to post-
onset duration. 
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What were the findings?  
Yeh and Tsai (2014) found stroke survivors – irrespective of hemisphere affected – 
performed poorer than control group on both cognitive and affective ToM items of the 
Faux Pas and Picture task. The differences retained significance even when general 
cognition was accounted for within the analysis. Similarly, Martory et al. (2015) 
revealed stroke survivors performed less accurately than healthy controls across all 
ToM measures (social cognition, adapted RMET and cartoons), although they also 
performed poorer on the subtasks that assessed general inferential abilities and 
executive functioning. Post-hoc analyses revealed that stroke patients with RHD 
performed poorer on the Cartoons subtest and RMET as well as one executive 
function measure (i.e., temporal rules), whereas the LHD sample performed 
significantly poorer than controls in the Social Cognition and Cartoons subtasks as 
well as the general inference task and one measure of executive functioning (i.e., 
absurd stories). Those with bilateral cerebrovascular accident were significantly 
impaired across all three theory of mind tasks, the general inference task and both 
aforestated executive function measures. It is plausible that the observed ToM deficits 
across the stroke samples may have been attributable to the domain-general deficits 
shown using the GeSoCS (e.g., executive dysfunction), however this was not explored 
within the study.  
Taken together, these studies suggest that – as well as stroke survivors with 
RHD – those with lesions in the left hemisphere also perform poorer on ToM tasks. 
This is consistent with neuroimaging studies that have shown left hemisphere 
activation in healthy adults while they complete social-cognitive ToM tasks (Fletcher 
et al., 1995). However, more recent evidence has implicated the left temporoparietal 
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junction as a structure that underpins the domain-general ability of perspective-taking 
(rather than ToM), which plays a significant role in ToM task performance (Perner et 
al., 2006). Again, this emphasises Apperly’s (2011) argument that highlights the 
presence of a variety of possible explanations for observed social-cognitive ToM 
deficits in people with acquired brain injury.  
 
Discrete Lesions  
Six studies explored the ToM capacities of stoke survivors with better defined lesions 
than the previously reviewed studies, including those located in the temporal lobes (Xi 
et al., 2013), cerebellum (Gerschcovich, Cerquetti, Tenca, & Leiguarda, 2011), right 
frontoinsular cortex and right putamen, claustraum and external capsule (Couto et al., 
2013), thalamus (Wilkos, Brown, Slawinska, & Kucharska, 2015) and left caudate 
nucleus (Kemp et al., 2013). Half of these investigation employed a case-controls 
design (Couto et al.; Gerschcovich et al.; Kemp et al.), which was appropriate 
considering that they aimed to test specific hypotheses regarding brain-behaviour 
relationships and it is likely investigators did not have access to many people with 
clearly defined lesions in the brain regions under investigation due to population rarity. 
In contrast to the other case-control studies, Couto et al. involved two stroke survivors, 
one (G.G.) who had an ischaemic insular cortex damage and the other who 
experienced a right subcortical haemorrhage involving the right putamen, claustrum 
and the external capsule (N.F.).  
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What ToM tasks were used?  
Each reviewed discrete lesion study involved the administration of the widely-used 
social-perceptual ToM task, RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), although two 
investigations included additional social-cognitive ToM tasks (Kemp et al., 2013; Xi et 
al., 2013). Xi et al. administered the Faux Pas task, whereas Kemp et al. employed a 
False-belief task alongside the Faux Pas task. These two aforestated studies were 
conducted in countries whereby English was not the native language and as such, the 
tasks were translated. The French version of the Faux Pas task administered within 
Kemp et al.’s study – similar to the original Faux Pas task (Stone et al., 1998) –
consisted of twenty short stories, half of which were control stories that did not contain 
a faux pas. On the other hand, the previously published Chinese-translated Faux Pas 
task (Zhu et al., 2007) used within Xi et al.’s (2013) study adapted the task such that 
it did not consist of non-faux pas stories. Kemp et al. also retained ToM questions from 
the classic task, which tapped first- and second-order cognitive attributions and 
affective reasoning, whereas Xi et al. omitted affective ToM questions. Although there 
is a significant evidence base demonstrating the excellent psychometric properties of 
the Faux Pas task in healthy and clinical populations (Soderstrand & Almkvist, 2012; 
Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009; Zhu et al., 2007), it is plausible that the 
alterations in Xi et al.’s investigation may have compromised its validity.  
Kemp et al. (2013) also administered a False-belief task (Ehrle, Henry, Pesa, 
& Bakchine, 2011), consisting of nineteen stories. Within this study, an investigator 
orally presented the false-belief stories to participants and subsequently asked three 
questions assessing first and second-order cognitive ToM, story comprehension and 
information recall. Although story recall is an important construct to assess within the 
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context of a false-belief task, which places significant demands on memory (Callejas, 
Shulman, & Corbetta, 2011; Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006), the omission of a general 
inferential ability question would suggest that the measure lacks the property to 
distinguish between specific ToM impairments and domain-general inferential deficits 
in stroke populations. As the original article for the False-belief task (Ehrle et al., 2011) 
used in the study was written in French, further details regarding the measure were 
not accessible.  
Two of the six studies that involved the administration of the RMET were 
conducted by the same research group based in the Laboratory of Experimental 
Psychology & Neuroscience, Institute of Cognitive Neurology, Argentina. The earlier 
study (Couto et al., 2013) described two female stroke patients, G.G. and N.F. (see 
above) who completed the RMET amongst other social cognition measures. The more 
recent investigation from the research group (Sedeno et al., 2016) was primarily 
concerned with assessing the social-executive behaviour profiles of patients with 
behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia, however also included 10 patients with 
frontoinsular lesions from stroke (four of which were selected to complete the RMET) 
and 12 healthy controls. Another Argentinian study (Gerschcovich et al., 2011) 
presented the results of the cognitive assessment (including RMET) of a 52-year old 
male patient who experienced a bilateral cerebellar infarction and compared this with 
21 age- and education-matched controls. In Poland, Wilkos et al. (2015) conducted a 
pilot study that compared the performance of eight acute stroke patients with unilateral 
thalamic lesions with 11 healthy control participants on a range of social cognition 
measures, including the RMET.  
The remaining two (previously discussed) studies used translated versions of 
the RMET. Kemp et al. (2013) translated the task to French, whereas Xi et al. (2013) 
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used a Chinese-translated version of the RMET (Wang, Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 
2008). In contrast to the original measure (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Xi et al.’s version 
consisted of 34 still images of the eye region of human faces and adapted the stimuli 
to exclusively consist of photographs of Asian people, thus increasing its applicability 
to the study’s Chinese sample. As was the case for the original study (Baron-Cohen 
et al.), participants in Xi et al.’s investigation were also instructed to judge the gender 
of the photographed individuals, which enabled the distinction between general visual 
deficits and specific social-perceptual ToM impairments. In contrast, the other discrete 
lesion studies did not include this aspect of the original RMET task, resulting in the 
presence of this possible extraneous variable, for which the chance of bias is 
exacerbated in stroke populations due to the high prevalence of visual impairment 
(Sand et al., 2013).  
 
Sampling Comparisons. 
Three studies demonstrated that the stroke and healthy controls were equivalent with 
regards to age and education (Gerschcovich et al., 2011; Kemp et al., 2013; Xi et al., 
2013), whilst additional information requested from Sedeno et al. (2016) revealed no 
significant between-group age or general cognition differences (see Appendix A). 
Similarly, the stroke and healthy controls within Xi et al.’s study were equivalent with 
respect to general cognition. In Couto et al.’s study, G.G. was matched with the control 
group with respect to age and education, however the second patient, N.F. was less 
formally educated than the controls. The authors attempted to minimise this potential 
threat to internal validity by conducting further statistical analyses whilst controlling for 
education level. On the other hand, there were clear age differences between the 
stroke and healthy controls within Wilkos et al.’s (2015) study. Due to the lack of group 
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matching within some studies, it is plausible that observed differences may be 
attributable to demographic variation, rather than the specific brain lesions. 
 
What were the findings?  
Firstly, Kemp et al. (2013) found that the male stroke survivor (MVG) with a left caudate 
nucleus lesion performed poorer than healthy controls on faux pas detection and ToM 
items, including affective and cognitive questions, whereas he performed just as well 
on the control items, suggesting MVG’s performance could not be attributed to the 
domain-general abilities of verbal comprehension and memory. Similarly, it was 
revealed that the stroke survivors with temporal lobe cerebral infarction in Xi et al. 
(2013) performed poorer than the healthy controls on the cognitive ToM items within 
the Faux Pas task, however no significant between-group differences were revealed 
with respect to both the story comprehension control items and faux pas detection.  
With regards to RMET observations, both studies from the Laboratory of 
Experimental Psychology & Neuroscience (Couto et al., 2013; Sedeno et al., 2016) 
found non-significant differences between the stroke (that affected the insular cortex 
or connections between this region and frontotemporal areas) and healthy control 
samples (see Appendix A for Mann-Whitney U test completed using data provided by 
Sedeno et al.). On the other hand, the remaining studies involving stroke survivors 
with clearly defined lesions showed that they performed poorer than healthy controls 
on the RMET (Gerschcovich et al., 2011; Kemp et al., 2013;Wilkos et al., 2015; Xi et 
al., 2013), with the latter also showing no significant differences on the associated 
gender discrimination task, thus ruling out visual deficits as an explanation for poor 
social-perceptual ToM performance. Considering these investigations involved stroke 
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survivors with different lesions, besides the two studies from the Laboratory of 
Experimental Psychology & Neuroscience, limited between-group comparisons can 
be made, however the observation of poor performance across these heterogeneous 
groups may be indicative of the various ways in which ToM may be compromised 
following stroke (i.e., domain-general processes). Nevertheless, there is a need for 
cross-sectional studies to further explore these apparent brain-behaviour links, as it is 
plausible that the findings from the case-control studies are confounded by sampling 
biases inherent within this design.
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Discussion  
What measures have been used to assess ToM in stroke populations and to 
what extent are they appropriate for use within this clinical group? 
A range of assessment tools were identified within the present review, ranging from 
those that evaluate the capacity to attribute either an affective or cognitive mental state 
to a protagonist, multi-componential measures that tapped into both cognitive and 
affective ToM and lastly, batteries that comprised separate ToM subtests. Most tasks 
were social-cognitive in nature, although the single-case control studies and a few 
cross-sectional investigations assessed social-perceptual ToM using the well-
established RMET. In general, the reviewed tasks included appropriate items that 
assessed ToM abilities as well as control items that provided examiners with the tools 
to distinguish between specific ToM impairments and domain-general deficits that 
some people within stroke populations may present with, including difficulties with 
general inferences.  
Some of the tasks identified within the literature were adaptations of established 
ToM tasks, such as the Faux Pas task (Stone et al., 1989), for which there are known 
psychometric properties in adults. Although, considering these tasks were sometimes 
manipulated within studies (e.g., altering the stimuli), it is plausible that this may have 
implications for their validity and reliability. Generally, the psychometric properties of 
the ToM measures were not explored within the reviewed studies, despite the 
tendency to employ novel tasks, suggesting that methodological robustness has not 
been properly considered within the literature. Furthermore, the absence of prior 
validation studies involving people who have experienced stroke limits the applicability 
of the reviewed ToM tasks in stroke populations, especially considering the prevalence 
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of deficits in domain-general abilities that may affect performance on ToM tasks, but 
not necessarily equate to an inability to infer mental states (Apperly, 2011). However, 
the GeSoCS (Martory et al., 2015) made some steps towards addressing this concern 
through incorporating executive function and general inference subtests, thus 
enhancing its status as a standalone ToM measure.  
Most of the reviewed measures were verbally-demanding in nature (e.g., false-
belief tasks), which may have been appropriate within the studies as they 
predominantly excluded stroke survivors with aphasia. However, considering the high 
prevalence of aphasia following stroke (Engelter et al., 2006), such verbal tasks may 
not provide a suitable way of assessing ToM within this population in clinical practice. 
The few, relatively novel, non-verbal measures revealed within the literature review, 
including the animations task (Weed et al., 2010), Picture task (Yeh & Tsai, 2014) as 
well as the established RMET might be more appropriate for assessing the ToM 
abilities of people with expressive and/or receptive language difficulties following 
stroke. Although, considering only one reviewed study included the gender recognition 
task associated with the RMET, there is the possibility that deficits identified by this 
social-perceptual task – in this form – may be attributable to visual impairment rather 
than compromised ToM. Unlike the other measures of ToM reviewed, the Affective 
Empathy Task (Leigh et al., 2013) involved dynamic and realistic video clip stimuli, 
which may be more reflective of social situations in real-life than static photographs 
(e.g., RMET) or artificial social-cognitive measures, thus enhancing its ecological 
validity.  
The revelation of novel social cognition batteries (Balaban et al., 2016; Martory 
et al., 2015) consisting of tasks that assess social-cognitive, and in the case of the 
GeSoCS, also social-perceptual ToM across verbal and visual modalities is promising. 
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Given that ToM is a multi-componential construct (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 
2010), such an approach to assessing it within stroke populations is likely to be 
advantageous in research and clinical practice.  
 
What conclusions can be drawn from the literature?  
Taken together, these studies have involved heterogeneous stroke samples, although 
a large proportion of the cross-sectional investigations solely recruited those with 
RHD. Given that recent neuroimaging research suggests the involvement of more 
clearly defined brain regions within the fronto-parietal-temporal network (Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009), the rationale for this continued interest in the right hemisphere is 
unclear. However, there were also studies that explored ToM abilities in stroke 
survivors with clearly defined lesions, which are better placed to make brain-behaviour 
conclusions than broad RHD and LHD investigations.  
Although not a criticism of any individual investigation, alongside the diverse 
range of measures used to tap ToM, the heterogeneous nature (e.g., different lesions, 
onset) of the stroke samples across the different studies restricts the extent to which 
meaningful comparisons can be made within the literature. In addition to the design 
flaws (e.g., poor group matching) evident within some studies, these between-study 
sample differences may account for the variable findings identified within the literature. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that stroke sometimes affects ToM performance, however, as 
Apperly (2011) argued, the challenge is pinpointing the explanation for poor 
performance across heterogeneous populations with acquired brain injury, including 
stroke.   
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Clinical implications 
Although some of the reviewed studies indicated ToM deficits in stroke populations, 
as a result of the myriad of within-and between-study limitations, any conclusions 
made must be tentative at this point. Nevertheless, the continued development of 
sensitive measures of ToM within the literature will benefit clinicians tracking social 
cognition outcomes of stroke survivors engaged in neurorehabilitation (Channon & 
Crawford, 2010). However, in order to establish the use of these tools within clinical 
practice, more clarity – than is offered within the existing literature base – is required 
with respect to the psychometric properties of these measures.  
In preparation of the potential translation of ToM assessment tools into clinical 
practice, it is imperative that ToM measures incorporating tasks that account for 
confounding domain-general abilities are developed and experimentally validated. The 
thorough assessment that can be provided by ToM tools with such properties will 
support clinicians in their formulation of the presenting core deficits and therefore, will 
have implications for the rehabilitation of people who experience stroke. For example, 
with the technology to diagnose specific ToM impairments, clinicians may be able to 
recommended more targeted ToM interventions (e.g., Lundgren & Brownell, 2010), 
which might be otherwise ineffective if the impairment is within domain-general 
cognitive abilities that are simply impinging on ToM task performance. The GeSoCS 
(Martory et al., 2015) enables the assessment of both social-cognitive and perceptual 
ToM across verbal and visual modalities within one clinical session, making it a good 
candidate for the eventual translation into rehabilitation practice. The utilisation of such 
tools which enable clinicians to tap into the multi-dimensional ToM profile of an 
individual with stroke may also have implications with regards to informing a strengths-
based approach to ToM abilities and tailoring rehabilitation practices accordingly.  
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Directions for Future Research 
Prior to any possible research to clinical translation, there is a clear need for quality 
improvement within the literature concerned with ToM abilities in stroke populations, 
to firstly, reduce sources of bias and increase understanding into the processes 
underlying possible ToM deficits. For this to be achieved, it is suggested that future 
studies  
• match stroke and healthy control samples according to age and education at 
the very least. Consideration of extraneous variables (e.g., cognition) will also 
enhance the quality of subsequent investigations. 
 
• report relevant psychometric properties for novel measures. However, it may 
be more advantageous for the literature to focus on developing existing ToM 
tasks by addressing the limitations highlighted within the review (e.g., omission 
of control items tapping into general inferential capacity), rather than the 
administration of unvalidated tasks. This theme of heterogeneity within the 
literature with regards to the ToM construct and how it is measured within stroke 
populations limits the extent to which comparisons and conclusions can be 
made, thus establishing gold standard tasks will be ideal.  
 
• utilise ToM measures with clear verisimilitude (e.g., stimuli that consists of 
dynamic video or voice clips) that tap different components of ToM (e.g., verbal 
vs. visual modality, affective vs. cognitive), such as the Cambridge Mindreading 
Face-Voice Battery (CAM; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006). This will ensure 
that findings generated within subsequent investigations are reflective real-
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world interpersonal situations that require ToM and move beyond the 
reductionist unitary perspective on the construct.   
 
• explore the domain-general cognitive processes that might be contributing to 
ToM task performance in stroke populations (e.g., to what extent are ToM 
deficits in stroke populations attributable to executive dysfunction?). This may 
offer some insight into the contrasting findings within the stroke literature. 
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Abstract 
Over the last twenty years there have been several investigations exploring theory of 
mind (ToM) abilities within populations with acquired brain injury, including stroke 
survivors. Most neuropsychology studies involving people with acquired brain injury 
have assessed the cognitively-demanding, social-cognitive component of ToM, 
whereas the literature concerned with exploring social-perceptual ToM is limited by its 
reliance on measures that are not representative of ToM processes within real-world 
situations. The current study aimed to examine the use and utility of an ecologically-
valid (verisimilitudinous) social-perceptual ToM task within stroke survivors, known as 
the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery (CAM; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 
2006). Group comparisons of CAM performance between 22 stroke survivors and 20 
age- and education-matched healthy control participants showed no significant 
differences. In addition, the CAM was unable to accurately distinguish between the 
groups. An exploratory cluster analysis revealed differential patterns of ToM 
impairment and preservation within the sample of stroke survivors. These findings 
suggest, studies that have attempted to tap social-perceptual ToM through artificial 
tasks and/or static stimuli may be overestimating the deficits observed within stroke 
samples, and tentatively points towards functional fractionation of social-perceptual 
ToM abilities dependent on modality. Some recommendations for future research 
combining neuropsychology and neuroimaging methodology are discussed.  
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Ecological Validity, Stroke, Acquired Brain Injury; 
Neuropsychological Assessment  
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Introduction 
‘Setting the Scene’  
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to one’s capacity to attribute mental states to self and 
other people and subsequently use these generated representations to evaluate, 
explain and anticipate consequential actions (e.g., Ollie is trying to cheer Sarah up 
because she is upset about coming fourth place in the bowling competition) (Brownell, 
Griffin, Winner, Friedman, & Happe, 2000). Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) 
argued that there are two components within ToM, namely, social-cognitive and social-
perceptual abilities. They proposed that the social-cognitive aspect of ToM fits with 
traditional definitions of ToM as a representational system, whereas the social-
perceptual component is involved in the on-line interpretation of readily accessible 
verbal (e.g., speech content, tone) and non-verbal information (e.g., facial expression, 
body language, actions).   
 
Social-Cognitive Theory of Mind  
Since the application of the ToM concept from chimpanzees (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978) to human infants and children (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006), it has predominantly 
been evaluated using social-cognitive tasks, particularly the False-belief paradigm 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Happe, 1994; Perner & Wimmer, 1988; Wimmer 
& Weichbold, 1994). False-belief tasks tap into a person’s ability to accurately 
conceptualise the incorrect belief state of a protagonist. For example, in the first-order 
Unexpected Transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), participants are presented with 
a narrative within which a protagonist leaves an item in a specific location and while 
they are absent, the item in question is displaced from its original location by a 
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deuteragonist. Following this scenario, participants are asked where the protagonist 
will first look for the object. In order to successfully complete the task, the participant 
must consider the fact that the protagonist is unaware that the item has been moved 
in their absence, thus accurately judge that the protagonist will initially search the 
wrong (original) location due to their inaccurate belief that the object is still where they 
had left it. Typically developing children from the age of 4 years are able to successfully 
perform child-friendly versions of the first-order False-belief task (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001), however the paradigm can be made more challenging through 
evaluating a person’s ToM capacity via second-order False-belief tasks, which taps 
into one’s ability to represent the beliefs that a protagonist holds about a 
deuteragonist’s false belief (e.g., Antonia believes that Ophelia thinks she is going to 
miss the school bus today).  
Although researchers tend to opt for false-belief tasks due to its advantage in 
being able to tease out a participant’s own true belief (e.g., that the object has been 
moved from its original location) and their capacity to represent beliefs (e.g., that the 
protagonist will search for the object where they left it), there are other widely used 
social-cognitive ToM tasks, for example the Faux Pas (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, 
Jones, Stone, & Plaisted, 1999; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998), Strange Stories 
(Happe, 1994; Happe, Brownell, & Winner, 1999) and Cartoons task (Corcoran, Cahill, 
& Frith, 1997; Happe et al., 1999; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche,& Widlocher, 1997). 
For the Faux Pas task, participants are verbally presented with a narrative that 
involves a protagonist making a tactless remark towards a deuteragonist. They are 
initially required to detect the occurrence of the social transgression (faux pas), and if 
successful, their understanding of the faux pas is further explored by questions that 
tap into participants’ ability to appreciate the mental state of the speaking protagonist 
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and/or receiving deuteragonist (e.g., why shouldn’t they have said it?). Similarly, the 
Strange Stories task involves the presentation of verbal stories, however in this case, 
the narratives were not limited to social situations involving a faux pas, for example it 
typically includes stories that involves the protagonist joking, lying or being sarcastic. 
Participants completing the Strange Stories task are initially required to judge whether 
what the protagonist said was true and they are subsequently asked to infer the 
intention of the protagonist (e.g., Jadon said it to trick his mother into giving him 
another snack). In contrast to the social-cognitive ToM tasks widely used in adult 
populations (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010), the Cartoons task presents the 
narratives visually, either in the form of comic strips or animated drawings. In its 
traditional configuration, this ToM measure requires participants to demonstrate an 
understanding of a social situation that is dependent on an appreciation of a 
protagonist’s and/or deuteragonist’s mental state (e.g., the fisherman is not aware that 
there is a shark behind him, so he thinks the other man is afraid of the crab attached 
to his fishing rod).   
Despite the typical inclusion of control items within these social-cognitive ToM 
measures (questions that evaluate whether a participant has adequately 
comprehended and/or retained key parts of a presented narrative, stimuli that requires 
participants to make non-mental state/general inferences, etc.), there remain potential 
drawbacks from assessing ToM using these tasks. Indeed, Apperly (2011) highlighted 
that a range of incidental performance demands were inherent within false-belief 
tasks, including verbal comprehension, attention, working memory and inhibition of 
self-perspective (true) belief. He argued that control items and/or stimuli within the 
traditional False-belief paradigm may not always sufficiently account for these 
extraneous cognitive demands. This is consistent with findings from experimental 
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research involving adults with acquired brain injury, which revealed that poor 
performance on False-belief tasks were – in some cases – attributable to executive 
impairment (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005) or difficulties 
in domain-general perspective-taking (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, Bickerton, & 
Humphreys, 2007; Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, 
Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004) rather than deficits specific to social-
cognitive ToM. 
Similarly, the Faux Pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) and Strange Stories (Happe, 
1994) task, require participants to extract explicit information conveyed within the 
spoken and/or written narratives in order to accurately infer the mental state of a 
protagonist. This prerequisite places significant demands on complex verbal 
processing and executive functions (Ahmed & Miller, 2011). They also argued that the 
incidental demands inherent within these tasks were likely tapping into similar 
constructs to established executive function measures, such as the Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function System (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). According to Muller et al. 
(2010), these verbal tasks also make substantial demands on pragmatic abilities, 
which may further detract from their purity as measures of social-cognitive ToM. 
Furthermore, faux pas detection has been linked to empathy, rather than being 
exclusive to the cognitive capacity to attribute mental states (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, 
& Husain, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003), raising 
further questions of Faux Pas task’s purity. Although the Cartoons task is more 
promising – as a social-cognitive ToM measure – with respect to its relative 
independence from verbal processing and working memory incidental demands 
(Corcoran et al., 1997), it has been found to have very high congruency with measures 
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of shifting, verbal fluency, inhibition and working memory, suggestive of substantial 
executive involvement (Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, Martory, & Annoni, 2011).  
Apperly (2011) argued, that given the substantial demands that false-belief 
tasks (and as discussed, other social-cognitive ToM tasks) made on general cognitive 
abilities, it was not surprising that poor performance is often observed in people with 
acquired brain injury, including those with lesions confined to the right hemisphere 
(Griffin et al., 2006; Happe et al., 1999; Martin & McDonald, 2006; Siegal, Carrington, 
& Radel 1996; Surian & Siegal, 2001), frontal lobes (Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 
2001; Stone et al., 1998; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001), amygdala (Stone, Baron-
Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003) and the left temporoparietal junction (Apperly 
et al., 2004). Although neuropsychological research within this area of social cognition 
has predominately focused on attempting to localise the brain regions responsible for 
ToM capacity through exploring the performance of patients with acquired brain injury 
on social-cognitive ToM tasks (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010), the primary 
challenge at hand is to distinguish the many possible reasons for poor performance in 
these tasks (Apperly, 2011). This includes deficits within the domain-general areas of 
executive functioning (Channon & Crawford, 2000), working memory (Stone et al., 
1998), and language comprehension (Surian & Siegal, 2001) amongst other general 
cognitive abilities that may sometimes account for the apparent social-cognitive ToM 
deficits observed in stroke populations, irrespective of the hemisphere affected (Yeh 
& Tsai, 2014).  
In an attempt to account for the cognitive demands inherent within these social-
cognitive ToM tasks, Apperly and others (Apperly, 2011; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009) 
proposed a dual route framework of ToM that consists of a slow, complex and flexible 
social-cognitive route that is heavily underpinned by domain-general cognitive 
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processes, such as executive functions, and a separate, less developmentally-
advanced route characterised by speed and efficiency, at the expense of both flexibility 
and the potential to solve complex problems (e.g., visual perspective-taking, social-
perceptual ToM). This theory emphasises the importance of the research findings 
derived from the use of social-cognitive ToM tasks, however also highlights that it is 
not the complete picture of ToM.  
 
Social-Perceptual Theory of Mind 
Following Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson’s (1997) study that 
involved the development of a task that tapped into the social-perceptual component 
of ToM, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RMET), there has been increasing 
interest in investigating this aspect of ToM within clinical populations, including those 
with acquired brain injury. Participants completing the RMET are presented with a 
selection of black-and-white pictures consisting of the eye region of human faces and 
are subsequently asked to select a word from two-options that best describe what the 
person within the photograph might be feeling or thinking. It has since been revised 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), so as to address some of 
the limitations within the earlier version, including increasing the number of items and 
possible forced-choice responses to enhance its capacity to differentiate between 
people with impaired and preserved social-perceptual ToM.  
There have been a number of studies exploring the performance of 
heterogeneous neurological populations on the RMET. Similar to evidence base for 
social-cognitive ToM, impaired performance has generally been observed (Havet-
Thomassin, Allain, Etcharry-Bouyx, & Le Gall, 2006; Henry, Philips, Crawford, 
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Ietswaart, & Summers, 2006; Martory et al., 2015; Milders, Fuchs, & Crawford, 2003). 
However, in contrast to evidence derived from social-cognitive ToM tasks (see 
previous sub-section), these social-perceptual findings may be less of a reflection of 
the differences – with respect to domain-general cognitive functioning – between 
groups with acquired brain injury and healthy controls. Indeed, Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) argued that the RMET involved unconscious, rapid and automatic processes 
that relied less on general cognitive abilities. They also revealed that performance on 
the task was independent of non-social aspects of intelligence, indicating its purity as 
a measure of ToM. Although evidence from a recent meta-analysis suggests that this 
social-perceptual ToM task does in fact place some demand on general intellectual 
functioning, this is minimal (Baker, Peterson, Pulos, & Kirkland, 2014). Similarly, dual-
task experimental studies have revealed that the RMET involves some inhibitory 
processing, although this was vastly inferior to the incidental processing demands 
within Happe’s (1994) Strange Stories (social-cognitive ToM) task, which was reliant 
on a range of executive functions, including inhibition, monitoring and updating 
working memory and switching (Bull, Philips, & Conway, 2008; McKinnon & 
Moscovitch, 2007). In contrast, Ahmed and Miller (2011) revealed that no executive 
function could account for the variance in RMET performance within adults aged 
between 18 and 27 years, although word-reading ability was a contributing factor. This 
discrepancy may be explained by the involvement of older adults in the earlier studies 
(Bull et al., 2008; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007), who might be more reliant on 
compensatory cognitive resources/neural substrates (e.g., executive processes) than 
younger adults to complete complex tasks (e.g., RMET) (Castelli et al., 2010; Reuter-
Lorenz et al., 2000) as a result of age-related changes in brain regions and white 
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matter tracts crucial to social-perceptual ToM (Cabinio et al., 2015; Moran, Jolly, & 
Mitchell, 2012).  
Alongside the RMET’s advantage over social-cognitive ToM tasks of (relative) 
independence from domain-general cognitive abilities, it has been found to be a better 
predictor of social communication (Ubukata et al., 2014). They argued that social-
perceptual ToM tasks better simulated real-world situations – involving the 
management of interpersonal interactions and relationships – than social-cognitive 
ToM tasks. This demonstrates receptivity to Channon and Crawford’s (2010) call for 
“clinical neuropsychology to develop assessment methods that can detect everyday 
social difficulties and identify which aspects of problem-solving are challenging for 
each individual, without necessarily requiring real-world observations, which are 
extremely time-consuming” (pg. 741). However, despite the demonstrable ecological 
validity of the RMET with respect to its predictive value on everyday tasks (veridicality), 
the use of static stimuli and reliance on the visual modality within the task is not 
representative of real-world ToM dilemmas (lacking verisimilitude). Turkstra (2008) 
found picture-based tasks (e.g., RMET) alongside narrative ToM tasks – due to the 
absence of cues that are readily available within everyday interpersonal interactions –
might overestimate the ToM deficits typically observed in populations with acquired 
brain injury, emphasising the importance of exploring the application of ToM tasks with 
verisimilitude. This is supported by a recent investigation that found the social-
perceptual ToM construct was better tapped by dynamic film-based stimuli than the 
RMET (Oakley, Bird, Brewer, & Catmur, 2016). 
In line with Stone and Hynes’ (2011) assertion that, “tests that relate to real-
world social functioning are valuable regardless of whether the tests are sensitive to 
specific regions of brain damage” (pg. 472), the present study will explore the use of 
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a task with verisimilitude, known as the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery 
(CAM; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006) within a heterogeneous stroke population 
(i.e., consisting of stroke survivors with diverse brain lesions). The CAM requires 
participants to decode the mental state of a human protagonist based on a dynamic 
voice or video clip of the actor. It is strongly correlated with the RMET, however 
provides a more thorough investigation of social-perception or in other words, the 
efficient ToM pathway defined by Apperly (2011), through both auditory and visual 
modalities, with the latter involving a video-clip consisting of actors in motion displaying 
a particular mental state (see Methods for further details). By exploring the extent to 
which the CAM can be used to differentiate between a heterogeneous stroke and 
healthy control sample, the current study aims to evaluate the utility of the CAM in 
assessing the ToM abilities of stroke survivors 
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Stroke survivors will perform poorer than healthy control participants on the CAM 
(verbal and visual ToM).  
H2: Performance on the CAM (verbal and visual component) will predict membership 
to group (stroke or healthy control)  
 
Methods 
Participants 
Stroke survivors were recruited from three National Health Service (NHS) community 
neurorehabilitation teams and an NHS neuropsychology team in the South East of 
England. People with stroke that met the inclusion criteria (see below) were identified 
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by a clinician previously or currently involved in their care and were provided with an 
information sheet (Appendix B). If verbal consent was provided, stroke survivors were 
approached by the principal researcher who provided further information and 
completed a brief screening assessment based on the exclusion criteria (see below). 
Out of the 41 stroke patients that consented for their details to be passed on to the 
researcher, 25 participated. Reasons for this attrition included stroke survivors 
meeting an exclusion criterion, lack of responsiveness to contact from the researcher 
or the participant deciding not to participate. After exclusions based on the above, 22 
eligible stroke patients between the ages of 36 and 89 years (M = 63.3, SD = 13.4) 
participated in the study. With consent from the stroke survivors, their partners were 
contacted and if agreeable following screening, they were provided with an information 
sheet (Appendix C) and recruited as healthy control participants. Further healthy 
controls were recruited via advertisements on social media outlets. Twenty eligible 
healthy control participants between the ages of 37 and 83 years (M = 64.4, SD= 10.7) 
took part in the study. The stroke and healthy control sample did not significantly differ 
in terms of age and education (see Table 1 for participant demographics). 
Participants were included on the basis of having the capacity to provide 
informed consent in written form (Department of Health, 2007). In line with the Mental 
Capacity Act, clinicians assumed potential participants in the stroke sample had 
capacity unless there were reasons to believe this was not the case. The same 
approach to capacity was adopted by the primary researcher with regards to the 
healthy controls. A lack of capacity was indicated if a potential participant was unable 
to understand and/or retain the information relevant to their decision to participate, use 
this information as part of a decision-making process and/or communicate their 
decision. Only participants aged 18 years or above, with normal or corrected-to-normal 
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vision and hearing, an ability to tolerate up to two hours of cognitive testing across one 
or two sessions, and fluency in English language were included. Stroke survivors were 
excluded if they self-reported any other neurological condition besides stroke. Healthy 
controls were included on the basis that they self-reported having no neurological 
condition, including stroke. Exclusion criteria across the stroke and healthy control 
group included a self-reported formal diagnosis of a severe and enduring mental 
health problem (i.e., schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, bipolar disorder, and 
personality disorder), a formal diagnosis of a neurodevelopmental condition, severe 
neuropsychological dysfunction (e.g., visual neglect) that may affect test performance, 
history of chronic substance misuse and a Mini-Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination 
(M-ACE; Hsieh et al., 2015) score of 21 or below. Three potential participants in the 
stroke sample were previously excluded based on their performance on the M-ACE 
being below the cut-off value, whereas one person was excluded from the healthy 
control group on the same basis.    
In accordance with the Code of Human Research Ethics (British Psychological 
Society, 2015), informed consent was obtained from all participating stroke survivors 
(Appendix D) and healthy controls (Appendix E) in written form. For stroke survivors 
who provided written consent, electronic and paper medical records were either 
accessed by the researcher or indirectly through clinicians. These data were accessed 
for the purposes of acquiring information on the nature of their stroke and history of 
previous stroke (Appendix F). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for Demographic Variables  
Demographics Stroke Healthy 
Control 
t/φc-statistic p value 
N 
 
22 20   
Age (years) 
 
M = 63.3        
SD = 13.40 
M = 64.4  
SD = 10.68 
t = -0.27 .79 
 
Education 
(years) 
 
 
M = 12.3  
SD = 2.07 
 
M = 13.2  
SD = 2.50 
 
t = -1.24 
 
.22 
Gender 
 
Male = 13 
Female = 9 
Male = 6 
Female = 14 
φc = 0.29 .06 
 
Dominant 
Hand 
 
Left = 1 
Right = 21 
 
Left = 5 
Right = 15 
 
φc = 0.29 
 
.06 
 
M-ACE 
(max = 30) 
 
M = 26.3  
SD = 2.51 
 
M = 28  
SD = 2.03 
 
t = -2.37* 
 
.02 
 
Processing 
Speed 
 
M = 28.8  
SD = 7.92 
 
M = 32.9  
SD = 7.08 
 
t = - 1.76 
 
.09 
 
DEX-total 
(max = 80) 
 
M = 28.9  
SD = 15.61 
 
M = 20.8  
SD = 9.20 
 
t = 2.03* 
 
.05 
 
Anxiety 
(max = 21) 
 
M = 9.5  
SD = 5.27 
 
M = 4.9  
SD = 2.53 
 
t = 3.55** 
 
<.001 
 
Depression 
(max = 21) 
 
M = 6.3  
SD = 3.46 
 
M = 2.2  
SD = 2.16 
 
t = 4.63** 
 
<.001 
Note. Descriptive statistics presented in frequency are in boldface. N = number; M-ACE = Mini-
Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination; DEX-total = Dysexecutive Questionnaire total score; M = Mean; 
SD = standard deviation; t = statistics; φc = Cramér’s V. 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
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Materials 
General Cognition. 
The Mini-Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination (M-ACE; Hsieh et al., 2015) was used 
to assess general cognition. The M-ACE is an abbreviated adaptation of the 
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination – Revised (Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, Arnold, & 
Hodges, 2006) and evaluates orientation (maximum score of 4 points), immediate 
verbal memory (maximum of 7), clock-drawing (maximum of 5), animal name/category 
fluency (maximum of 7) and delayed verbal memory (maximum of 7). A total of 30 
points are available from the cognitive screening tool. The recommended cut-off score 
of 21 yielded a sensitivity of 61% and 100% specificity for dementia (Hsieh et al., 
2015). It has a good internal consistency (α = .83) and concurrent validity (rs = .83) 
using the Mini Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).  
 
Processing Speed.  
A modified version of the Information Processing A task in the Adult Memory and 
Information Processing Battery (Vlaar & Wade, 2003; see also Coughlan & Hollows, 
1985) was used to measure processing speed. The test consists of 105 rows of five 
2-digit numbers (Appendix G), and the participant is instructed to call out the second 
highest number in each row of five numbers following a demonstration by the 
researcher and performing the practice trial of 5 rows. The participant is instructed to 
complete as many rows as possible within two minutes. The examiner or participant 
switched over to another laminated paper stimuli (consisting rows of numbers) once a 
page had been completed by the participant. The total score was calculated as the 
number of correct responses made within the time limit subtracted by the number of 
incorrect answers.  
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Mood. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was 
used to evaluate the extent to which participants were experiencing symptoms of 
anxiety and depression. The HADS consists of 14 items, each of which can be 
responded to using a four-point scale ranging from 0 to 3. Possible scores for the 
depression and anxiety constructs both range from 0 to 21, higher scores indicating a 
greater extent of anxiety or depression.  
 
Theory of Mind.  
ToM was assessed using the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery (CAM; 
Golan et al., 2006). It consists of two separate tasks that evaluate the recognition of 
20 different complex emotion and mental state concepts from visual (face) or verbal 
(voice) cues. These tasks were presented via laptop computer and ran on DMDX 
experimental software (Forster & Forster, 2003). For the Voice task, following an 
instruction screen and two practice items, the participant listened to fifty brief audio 
clips whereby an actor expressed different emotional intonations. In the case of the 
Face task, following the instructions and practice trials, participants were presented 
with fifty 3-5 second silent video clips of actors portraying different emotions through 
their facial expression. A set of laminated sheets with definitions of each possible 
emotion/mental state word response was available during the experimental session 
(see Appendix H), which participants were encouraged to use if they were unsure of 
a word during any trial. There was no time limit for responding to items.  
Items within both tasks were randomly presented. After the presentation of each 
stimulus (i.e., watching a video clip or listening to a voice recording), participants were 
instructed to select an adjective, from four options, that best described the mental state 
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being conveyed within the clip. The Face (visual) and Voice (verbal) ToM score for 
participants was indicated by calculating the percentage of correct responses within 
the respective tasks. The CAM has good test-retest reliability (r = .94 and .81 for the 
Face and Voice component, respectively) and strong concurrent validity (r = .74 for 
the Face task and .62 for the Voice task) using the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
and Reading the Mind in the Voice task (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 
2007), respectively.  
 
Executive Function. 
The DEX questionnaire (Wilson, Evans, Emslie, Alderman, & Burgess, 1998) was 
used as a measure of executive functioning. It is a widely used 20-item self-report 
questionnaire in Likert format. Using a 5-point scale ranging from never (0 point) to 
very often (4 points), participants are instructed to rate each item on the frequency by 
which they experience executive function-related difficulties within their daily life. 
Possible scores for the DEX range from 0 to 80, higher scores indicating a greater 
extent of executive dysfunction.  
 
Design 
The study utilised a between-groups design to enable comparisons between stroke 
survivors and healthy controls. To test hypothesis 1, participant group (stroke or 
healthy control) served as the independent variable and verbal and visual ToM 
(measured by the CAM) were the dependent variables. As hypothesis 2 was 
concerned with the extent to which the CAM scores could predict whether a person 
belonged to the stroke or healthy control sample, group membership was entered as 
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the dependent variable, whereas performance on the CAM Face and Voice tasks 
served as independent variables within a discriminant function analysis.  
 
Data Analysis 
Data were stored and analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics version 23. Prior to 
commencing statistical analysis, the data were checked for any violations of 
parametric assumptions (Appendix I). As there were significant differences between 
the M-ACE scores of the stroke and healthy control samples (see Table 1), a one-way 
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) with the M-ACE score as a covariate was 
completed alongside an independent sample t-test for parametric between-group 
comparisons (see Appendix J for ANCOVA assumption checks4). Discriminant 
function analysis was used to predict group membership (stroke or healthy control) 
from CAM performance.  
As part of the experimental design planning phase, an a priori power calculation 
using the effect size from a previous study (Yeh & Tsai, 2014) was completed to 
estimate an appropriate sample size for the present investigation. The alpha level was 
set at the conventional level of 5% and power was placed at 95%. Eleven participants 
for each group was estimated for the between-group parametric comparisons (see 
Appendix K). In comparison to previous literature, Yeh and Tsai’s study had the largest 
sample size, so was deemed the most suitable paper from which to derive power 
calculations for the present study.  
 
                                                          
4
 The ANCOVA assumption of linearity of regression was violated for the between-group comparison 
of CAM Face (Visual) and Voice (Verbal) tasks 
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Procedures 
Before beginning the experiment, participants were informed of their right to withdraw 
from the study without giving reason. If the primary investigator suspected that a 
participant was becoming distressed or fatigued during the experiment, a rest break 
was suggested. In such a case, the researcher also asked participants whether they 
would prefer to continue the experiment on another scheduled occasion.  
Participants completed the experiment within their home (following local NHS 
Trust lone-working policy) or Trust sites across the South East of England. The 
cognitive tests and self-report questionnaires were completed within one or two 
sessions. It took the stroke survivors between 90 and 180 minutes to complete the 
experiment, whereas the healthy control participants generally completed the battery 
of tasks and questionnaires in under two hours.  
For laptop computer-based tasks (i.e., CAM), participants were seated at a 
table in front of the laptop screen. The principal investigator was seated at an angle 
that enabled full view of the screen, so that support could be offered during practice 
trials. To minimise measurement errors from modality presentation order (verbal vs. 
visual) during the computerised tasks, half of the stroke and healthy control sample 
were presented with the CAM Voice task before the CAM Face task, whereas the 
remaining participants’ completion of the Voice task was preceded by its visual 
counterpart. All collected data were pseudonymised using participant codes. Physical 
data were stored in a lockable drawer and separated from completed consent forms. 
Electronic data were stored in an NHS Trust encrypted and password-protected USB 
flash drive.  
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Results 
An independent sample t-test was initially presented for the first hypothesis, following 
which a re-analysis was conducted with M-ACE scores as a covariant within an 
ANCOVA. 
 
Between-Group Theory of Mind Performance 
It was hypothesised that stroke survivors will perform poorer than the healthy controls 
on the verbal ToM task (CAM Voice). An independent sample t-test comparing the 
groups revealed that there were no significant differences, t(40) = -1.33, p (one-tailed) 
= .09, between the CAM Voice accuracy of the healthy control (M = 75.25%, SD = 
10.97%) and stroke samples (M = 70.46%, SD = 12.27%). An ANCOVA also revealed 
that there was no significant between-group difference in CAM Voice after controlling 
for M-ACE scores, F(1, 39) = .11, p (one-tailed) = .37. 
It was also hypothesised that stroke survivors would perform poorer than the 
healthy controls on the visual ToM task (CAM Face). An independent sample t-test 
comparing the groups revealed that there were no significant differences, t(40) = -.79, 
p (one-tailed) = .22, between the CAM Face accuracy of the healthy control (M = 
68.10%, SD = 11.38%) and stroke samples (M = 65.36%, SD = 11.09%). An ANCOVA 
also showed no differences between the groups on CAM Face accuracy after 
controlling for M-ACE scores, F(1, 39) = .01, p (one-tailed) = .47. 
 
Group Membership Prediction 
It was hypothesised that there will be a significant discriminant function of verbal and 
visual ToM for group membership (stroke or healthy control), however the discriminant 
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analysis revealed a non-significant discriminant function of the CAM, χ2(2) = 1.73, p = 
.42. 
 
Exploratory Analyses  
Given the unexpected non-significant between-group differences and discriminant 
function of the CAM, it was hypothesised that there would be wide variance in the 
scores of the stroke sample. As this was confirmed through a physical inspection of 
the data, an exploratory hierarchical cluster analysis was completed for the purpose 
of characterising different CAM profiles within the stroke sample. Hierarchical 
clustering was selected based on the small stroke sample size (Norušis, 2011). In line 
with a previous study examining ToM clusters in stroke populations (Champagne-
Lavau & Joanette, 2009), Ward’s method to hierarchical clustering was selected.  
Four clusters indicative of distinct ToM performance patterns were revealed 
(see Figure 1). Four rather than three clusters were selected for the analysis as, on 
visual inspection, participants 8 and 17’s scores appeared qualitatively different from 
others in the stroke sample, and so a separate cluster for this sub-group was deemed 
appropriate. This included stroke survivors with preserved performance on the visual 
ToM task, but superior performance – in comparison to healthy controls – on the verbal 
ToM task (preserved group), those with a trend towards poorer performance on the 
verbal ToM task and preserved performance on visual ToM (specific verbal ToM 
impairment), those with poorer performance on both the verbal and visual ToM tasks 
(global ToM impairment group) and lastly, two stroke patients that formed a separate 
cluster, however were found to perform as well as the healthy controls across the 
verbal and visual ToM tasks (two-sample group). A Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed no 
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significant differences between the clusters with regards to age, χ2(4) = 4.41, p = .35, 
and education, χ2(4) = 6.35, p = .18 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). However, 
the difference between the specific verbal ToM impairment (Mdn = 13 years) and 
global ToM impairment (Mdn = 11 years) clusters with regards to education was close 
to significance, U = 9.5, p = .07.  
Differences in cognition (general and processing speed) between the stroke 
subgroups and healthy controls were considered below.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Dendogram using Ward’s method on the stroke sample 
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Global ToM impairment.  
This subgroup consisted of six stroke survivors (p2, p3, p5, p14, p18, p21) that 
performed poorer than the healthy groups on both the verbal ToM, U = 6.50, p = .001) 
and visual ToM tasks, U = 10.0, p = .002. This pattern of ToM co-occurred with 
cognitive impairment relative to healthy controls. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that 
the global ToM impairment subgroup performed worse than the healthy control sample 
on processing speed, U = 14.0, p = .01, while the between-group difference – in favour 
of the healthy control group – with regards to the M-ACE was close to significance, U 
= 31.50, p = .08.  
 
Preservation in ToM. 
This subgroup consisted of seven stroke survivors (p4, p6, p7, p9, p15, p20, p22) who 
performed better than the healthy control group on the verbal ToM task, U = 34.00, p 
= .05, while the between-group difference – in favour of the stroke cluster – with 
regards to accuracy on the visual ToM task was close to significance, U = 37.00, p = 
.07. There were no significant differences revealed between the preserved stroke 
cluster and healthy control sample on processing speed, U = 64.50, p = .76, and M-
ACE, U = 64.50, p = .76. 
 
Two-sample subgroup (unimpaired).  
Only two stroke survivors (p8 and p17) formed this subgroup. Due to the very small 
sample size of this cluster, Crawford & Howell’s (1998) approach to single-case 
comparisons was used to compare their performance to the healthy control sample. 
Both participants showed no deficit for verbal ToM tasks compared to controls, for p8, 
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t(19) = -0.29, p(one-tailed) = 0.39, and for p17, t(19) = -0.29, p(one-tailed) = 0.39. 
Similarly, neither participant showed deficit for the visual ToM task compared to 
controls, for p8, t(19) = -1.21, p (one-tailed) = 0.12, and for p17, t(19) = -1.21, p(one-
tailed)= 0.12. 
Participant 8 showed no deficit for general cognition, t(19) = -0.96, p (one-tailed) 
= 0.17, however showed deficits for processing speed, t(19) = -2.88, p (one-tailed) = 
0.01. On the other hand, participant 17 showed no deficit for general cognition, t(19) 
= 0.00, p (one-tailed)= 0.50 nor processing speed, t(19) = -1.23, p (one-tailed)= 0.12.  
 
Specific impairment in verbal ToM. 
This subgroup consisted of seven stroke survivors (p1, p10, p11, p12, p13, p16, p19) 
who performed as well as the healthy controls on the visual ToM task, U = 66.50, p = 
.85), while the between-group difference – in favour of the healthy controls – with 
regards to accuracy on the verbal ToM task, was close to significance, U = 39.5, p = 
.09. This subgroup of the stroke sample performed poorer than the healthy controls 
on the M-ACE, U = 20.50, p < .001), however there was no statistically significant 
difference with regards to processing speed, U = 53.50, p = .36.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Stroke Clusters and Healthy Control Sample  
Variable A-VER GLOB PRES TWO HC 
      
N 7 6 7 2 20 
 
Age (years) 
 
Mdn = 70.0 
IQR = 10.0 
 
Mdn = 66.0 
IQR = 15.0 
 
Mdn = 60.0 
IQR = 19.0 
 
Mdn = 52.0 
IQR = N/A 
 
Mdn = 65.5 
IQR = 12.8 
 
Education 
(years) 
 
Mdn = 11.0 
 IQR = .0 
 
Mdn = 11.0 
IQR = 2.0 
 
Mdn = 13.0 
 IQR = 5.0 
 
Mdn = 11.0 
IQR = N/A 
 
Mdn = 11.5 
IQR = 4.8 
      
Verbal ToM      
(%) 
Mdn = 70.0 
IQR = 4.0 
Mdn = 58.0 
IQR= 11.5 
Mdn = 85.0 
IQR = 12.0 
Mdn = 72.0 
IQR = N/A 
Mdn = 75.0 
IQR = 18.0 
 
Visual ToM 
(%) 
 
Mdn = 68.0 
IQR = 8.0 
 
Mdn = 50.0 
IQR = 4.0 
 
Mdn = 79.0 
IQR = 13.0 
 
Mdn = 54.0 
IQR = N/A 
 
Mdn = 69.0 
IQR = 17.0 
      
Processing 
Speed 
Mdn = 31.0 
IQR = 8.0 
Mdn = 22.0 
IQR = 8.0 
Mdn = 31.0 
IQR = 10.0 
Mdn = 18.0 
IQR = N/A 
Mdn = 32.5 
IQR = 11.0 
 
M-ACE 
(max = 30) 
 
Mdn = 25.0 
IQR = 5.0 
 
Mdn = 25.0 
IQR = 4.0 
 
Mdn = 28.0 
IQR = 2.0 
 
Mdn = 27.0 
IQR = N/A 
 
Mdn = 29.0 
IQR = 2.0 
Note. A-VER = stroke patients impaired on visual ToM only; GLOB = stroke patients impaired on both verbal and 
visual ToM; PRES = stroke patients unimpaired on both verbal and visual ToM; TWO = two-sample cluster with 
unimpaired performance across ToM tasks; HC = healthy controls; M-ACE = Mini-Addenbrooke's Cognitive 
Examination; Mdn = Median; IQR = Interquartile Range; N/A = not applicable. 
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Figure 2. Median Accuracy on the Cambridge Face (Visual Theory of Mind) and Voice (Verbal Theory 
of Mind) Tasks for the Stroke Clusters and Healthy Control Sample 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Theory of Mind & Group Differences 
The present study sought to evaluate the utility of a relatively novel, dynamic and 
ecologically-valid test of social-perceptual ToM – the Cambridge Mindreading Face-
Voice Battery (CAM) – in stroke populations through investigating its capacity to 
distinguish between stroke survivors and an age- and education-matched healthy 
control sample. It was predicted that stroke survivors would perform poorer than 
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healthy controls on the CAM, however no significant differences were identified within 
both the Face and Voice ToM tasks. Given the aforementioned findings, it is of no 
surprise that the null hypothesis was accepted for the second hypothesis, which 
predicted that CAM Face and Voice scores would be able to accurately differentiate 
between the heterogeneous stroke sample and healthy controls. 
These findings contrast with the majority of the social-cognitive (Martin-
Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 2010) and social-perceptual ToM literature (Henry et al., 
2006; Ubukata et al., 2014), which show people with acquired brain injury (including 
stroke populations) perform poorer than healthy controls on these tasks (Martory et 
al., 2015; Yeh & Tsai, 2014). It is plausible that the presence of specific cues (motion, 
intonation, etc.) within the dynamic CAM was sufficient in enabling stroke survivors to 
accurately decode the mental state of a protagonist, whereas most tasks within the 
literature were either heavily dependent on domain-general abilities (viz., social-
cognitive ToM tasks that rely on the slow route) or in the case of social-perceptual 
tasks that are underpinned by the efficient ToM route, the artificial nature of the stimuli 
may have lacked perceptual information that would normally be available within natural 
environments (e.g., motion patterns) (Turkstra, 2008). However, Turkstra found that 
patients with moderate to severe acquired brain injury (mostly traumatic brain injury) 
performed poorer on a video-based ToM task that required participants to make 
mental state inferences and subsequent predictions based on the interaction between 
two protagonists (e.g., I think those two people won’t want to hang out in the future as 
they are not getting along).  
There are two main factors that may explain why the current study did not reveal 
differences between the heterogeneous stroke and healthy controls, whereas 
Turkstra’s (2008) study did. Firstly, the video-based task in Turkstra’s study tapped 
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into social-cognitive ToM, which the author highlighted was partly dependent on 
working memory due to the requirement for participants to track the 30-second video 
clips. Thus, it is possible that the observed ToM deficits are attributable to domain-
general executive function impairment within the acquired brain injury sample. 
Although the cognitively-demanding social-cognitive ToM is also relevant to social 
functioning (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), the likelihood that the video-based task is 
tapping into a different construct to the CAM may explain the discrepancy with the 
present study. This is supported by recent research that identified non-significant 
relationships between the RMET and social-cognitive tasks (e.g., Faux Pas) (Ahmed 
& Miller, 2011; Xi et al., 2013). Secondly, Turkstra’s study predominantly involved 
people with severe traumatic brain injury, which is likely to result in widespread brain 
lesions – due to diffuse axonal injury (Skandsen et al., 2010) – and as a result, greater 
level of global impairment than the stroke sample involved in the present study.  
To the best of my knowledge, there are only two recent studies that have utilised 
realistic and dynamic stimuli to measure ToM in stroke populations (Leigh et al., 2013; 
Oishi et al., 2015). Leigh et al. found 14 out of 27 of the stroke patients with right 
hemisphere damage – involved in their study – were impaired on a task that required 
participants to infer the affective state of a protagonist based on short videotapes and 
narrated stories. They found 9 (out of the 14) stroke patients had damage to the brain 
regions in the so-called theory of mind network (Saxe, 2006; Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004). Oishi et al. later linked this social-cognitive (affective) ToM deficit 
to damage to the uncinate fasciculus (white matter tract that connects parts of the 
limbic system [e.g., amygdala] to prefrontal regions). As the lesion data within the 
present study was mostly unavailable, limited comparisons can be made to these 
previous investigations. However, it remains a possibility that the heterogeneous 
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stroke sample involved in the current study generally had lesions in brain areas distinct 
from the ToM network, namely the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, 
temporoparietal junction/superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles (Carrington & 
Bailey, 2009), which would explain the present findings. Indeed, Participant 21 who 
had a left temporal lobe lesion (which consists of the amygdala) and Participant 5 who 
had prefrontal lesions were found to have both visual and verbal social-perceptual 
ToM deficits in the present study (see Appendix F). Nevertheless, the discrepancy with 
previous studies may not be unexpected considering the CAM taps into what Baron-
Cohen et al. (2001) referred to as the first step in ToM, thus it may be more crystallised 
and less likely – than complicated social-cognitive ToM tasks – to be affected by an 
acquired brain injury endured during adulthood.   
Furthermore, these previous studies (Leigh et al., 2013; Oishi et al., 2015) 
recruited neurologically-intact controls as confirmed by magnetic resonance imaging, 
whereas the present study relied on healthy controls self-reporting no acquired brain 
injuries. In comparison to the CAM female norms (Golan et al., 2006), the healthy 
controls in the present study – which predominantly consisted of female participants –
scored under two and four standard deviations below the mean on the Voice and Face 
tasks components of the CAM, respectively. It is possible that there was a significant 
presence of undiagnosed neurological and/or neurodevelopmental conditions within 
the healthy controls, which may have minimised between-group differences with the 
stroke sample. Although, considering Golan et al. mostly involved young adults (M = 
27.1 years) as their healthy control group to develop these norms, whereas the 
average age of the present study’s controls was 64.4 years, the aforementioned CAM 
disparity between healthy controls may be attributed to the well-documented effects 
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of older age on social-perceptual and social-cognitive ToM task performance (Henry, 
Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). 
Although the CAM was unable to accurately distinguish between stroke and 
healthy controls in the present study, it was found to be able to allocate 90% of adults 
with high-functioning autistic spectrum condition and healthy controls to their correct 
groups (Golan et al., 2006). This contrast might suggest that different processes 
underpin the poor ToM performance of adults with autistic spectrum condition and 
those with acquired brain injury observed within the literature. It is plausible that there 
is a core deficit in decoding mental states from cues for people with autistic spectrum 
condition (explaining why poor performance in social-perceptual ToM tasks is still 
observed when dynamic cues are readily available), whereas the majority of apparent 
deficits found in stroke and other acquired brain injury populations may be attributable 
to deficits in domain-general abilities, including executive functioning and pragmatic 
language (Apperly, 2011). Nevertheless, the present study is the only investigation 
that has utilised dynamic stimuli to explore social-perceptual ToM abilities within stroke 
populations, with other similar adult studies having involved people with unidentified 
or absent lesions, such as adults with autistic spectrum condition (Golan et al., 2006, 
2007) or healthy adult parents of children with autistic spectrum condition (Tajmirriyahi, 
Nejati, Pouretemad, & Sepehr, 2013).  
 
Fragmentation of Theory of Mind 
The exploratory cluster analysis revealed four subgroups within the heterogeneous 
stroke sample based on ToM performance, three of which appeared distinct from the 
healthy controls. This included a stroke subgroup with impairments across the verbal 
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and visual ToM tasks, a group that performed better than healthy controls on verbal 
ToM (while their more accurate performance on the visual ToM task approached 
significance) and lastly, a subgroup who were preserved in verbal and visual ToM 
(although their poorer performance on verbal ToM approached significance). These 
subgroups had differing patterns of performance in domain-general cognitive abilities, 
namely, general cognition (as measured by the M-ACE) and processing speed. 
However, given the lack of detailed and consistent lesion data obtained within the 
present study, conclusions on specific brain region-behaviour relationships cannot be 
drawn, however the pattern of impairment and preservation across verbal and visual 
ToM is indicative of the fractionation of ToM by presented modality. This is in contrast 
to previous functional magnetic resonance imaging studies (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; 
Mar, 2011; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014) which have revealed 
a core ToM brain network irrespective of the task type (social-perceptual vs. social-
cognitive) or modality (visual vs. verbal). 
However, both the findings of these previous neuroimaging studies and the 
current investigation could be accounted for by Cabeza, Ciaramelli, and Moscovitch’s 
(2012) overarching account of brain functioning, which proposes the idea that 
functional subdivisions within the brain underpin specific aspects of global cognitive 
function (e.g., ToM) supported by broad brain regions (e.g., ToM network). Thus, 
activation in specific brain regions – observed in previous neuroimaging studies – may 
not necessarily suggest that they are crucial to successfully completing ToM tasks, 
although as Apperly (2011) implied, lesions in these subdivisions may contribute to 
the many reasons (executive dysfunction, impaired perspective-taking, pragmatic 
deficits, etc.) people with acquired brain injury might perform poorly on ToM tasks, 
which may have been less prevalent within the present stroke sample. This 
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explanation is consistent with a single-case study involving a female patient (G.T.) with 
extensive bilateral damage to the medial frontal lobe who presented with executive 
dysfunction, however was relatively preserved across a range of social-cognitive 
tasks, including the Strange Stories and Faux Pas task (Bird et al., 2004). As the 
authors argued, spared areas of G.T.’s medial frontal lobes may have been sufficient 
to subserve her ToM abilities, although – as per the overarching theory – this may 
have been made possible due to preservation of other functional subdivisions 
contributing to ToM (i.e., other regions within the ToM network) alongside preserved 
areas of the medial prefrontal cortex. This hypothesis is further supported by a recent 
experimental investigation by Samson, Houthuys, and Humphreys (2015), which 
revealed that general executive dysfunction – similar to that exhibited by G.T. – does 
not necessarily result in deficits to the self-perspective inhibition functions crucial to 
successful performance in traditional false-belief tasks.  
Furthermore, the overarching perspective applied to ToM (Apperly, 2010; 
Cabeza et al., 2012) – which suggests different regional subdivisions and cognitive 
processes contribute to ToM – is consistent with the exploratory findings within the 
present study, which revealed that the stroke subgroup with a global ToM impairment 
(verbal and visual) processed information slower than the healthy controls. Also, the 
p-value (.08) for the difference between this global ToM impaired subgroup and the 
healthy controls with regards to global cognition – indicating poorer performance – 
was close to significance. It is plausible that this non-significant difference is 
attributable to the insufficient experimental power within the non-parametric analysis 
used to detect a between-group difference, resulting in Type II error. Similarly, the 
subgroup with (likely) specific verbal ToM impairment performed poorer than the 
healthy control on the general cognition measure. Indeed, these findings are in line 
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with the view that ToM abilities may be underpinned by a myriad of domain-general 
processes (e.g., semantic memory), which are themselves innervated by diverse brain 
regions (Frith, 2007; Legrand & Ruby, 2009). 
On the other hand, the preserved stroke subgroup performed better than the 
healthy controls on the verbal ToM task, while their superior performance on the visual 
ToM task approached significance (p = .07). This cluster did not differ from the healthy 
control group with respect to general cognition or processing speed, although when 
compared to the subgroup with a global ToM impairment, they were better educated 
(p = .07). Despite this education between-group difference not quite meeting the 
significance criterion, given the exploratory nature of these results, it may offer a valid 
explanation for the preservation of ToM in this subgroup. Indeed, these findings are 
consistent with the cognitive reserve hypothesis (Kesler, Adams, Blasey, & Bigler, 
2003) which suggests that greater academic attainment may abate vulnerability to 
cognitive deficits following acquired brain injury, if it is assumed similar processes may 
underpin ToM. This hypothesis is supported by studies involving social-cognitive and 
social-perceptual ToM tasks that have found education to be a significant contributing 
factor to performance (Oishi et al., 2015; Yildirim et al., 2011). Nevertheless, these 
tentative conclusions based on very small samples, particularly those derived from 
marginally non-significant findings, will need to be explored within future studies in 
neuropsychology. Despite this limitation, the involvement of stroke survivors rather 
than people who have experienced traumatic brain injury is an advantage with respect 
to the former having less widespread brain lesions (Martin-Rodriguez & Leon-Carrion, 
2010), thus enabling these tentative hypotheses (e.g., ToM fractionation).    
Taken together, these findings emphasise the importance of assessing social-
perceptual ToM across auditory and visual modalities, and as such, the use of the 
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RMET in isolation may not be sufficient in capturing this construct within stroke 
survivors.  
 
Limitations  
The present investigation has some limitations, including the lack of detailed lesion 
data to enable firm brain-behaviour conclusions, and reliance on the self-reported 
absence of neurological and neurodevelopmental conditions within the healthy 
controls. Furthermore, the omission of an additional ToM measure (e.g., RMET), social 
functioning assessment tool, control tasks for the CAM (e.g., Gender Identification 
task, Basic Emotion Recognition task; see Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 2001) that could 
rule out potential confounds (impairments in visual perception/memory, emotion 
recognition, etc.) and lack of detailed cognitive assessment tools (besides a cognitive 
screening measure and a test of processing speed) limits the conclusions that can be 
made within the current study. This is particularly with regards to localising the brain 
regions and/or domain-general cognitive functions that may underpin performance on 
the CAM as well as its clinical implications. Nevertheless, upon further investigation, 
the CAM may offer a more ecologically-valid way of assessing social-perceptual ToM 
in stroke populations. This will have implications for identifying people who may benefit 
from ToM remediation interventions (Lundgren & Brownell, 2015) and tailoring them 
accordingly. Although, the psychometric assessment of a complex ability such as ToM 
may be somewhat reductionist, thus future studies may consider observational tools 
to capture the richness of this aspect of social cognition.  
With regards to sample demographics, there were more men than women in 
the stroke sample, whereas there were more women than men in the healthy control 
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sample (p = .06). Previous research has revealed women perform better in visual 
social-perceptual tasks, including the CAM Face task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; 
Golan et al., 2006), indicative of the importance of gender-matching. Nevertheless, the 
stroke sample – as a whole – appeared to perform as well as the healthy controls on 
the CAM, and as such, the imbalanced samples may have had less implications in this 
instance. As there are no age-norms for the CAM, the extent to which the healthy 
control sample in the present study represents a typical adult population is unclear. 
Norms for middle and late adulthood should be established in future studies using the 
CAM.  
Although the use of stroke survivors’ partners as control participants facilitated 
well-matched comparison samples, the knowledge that their spouse was also going 
to complete the same cognitive battery may have influenced their performance (i.e., 
through exacerbated performance anxiety). Furthermore, as most participants were 
tested in their homes, precise environmental control was not possible (e.g., noise, 
lighting), which may have had implications for their performance on the cognitive 
measures and thus, the internal validity of the findings. Lastly, the stroke sample were 
recruited from community teams, who despite attempts to recruit a representative 
sample, were more likely to refer high-functioning stroke survivors based on clinical 
rationale. 
  
 
Future studies 
In addition to addressing the aforementioned limitations, more elaborate single- and/or 
multiple-case design studies investigating the regions affected within the differentially 
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ToM-impaired stroke clusters (e.g., specific verbal ToM deficits, global ToM deficits) 
should be considered. As well as exploring the brain-behaviour relationships, it would 
be valuable to investigate the cognitive processes that might underpin these 
hypothesised associations in combination with neuroimaging technology (e.g., 
functional magnetic resonance imaging) to explore possible functional subdivisions. 
There have been preliminary findings suggestive of the importance of specific brain 
regions (cerebellum and temporal lobes, etc.) in ToM task performance 
(Gerschcovich, Cerquetti, Tenca, & Leiguarda, 2011; Xi et al., 2013), however this 
may benefit from replication using ecologically-valid ToM tasks, such as the CAM. 
 
Conclusion 
The present study is the first investigation exploring social-perceptual ToM abilities in 
stroke survivors using a dynamic and ecologically-valid measure of the construct, 
which in this case was the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice battery (CAM). No 
significant differences in ToM performance were revealed between the heterogeneous 
stroke and age- and education-matched healthy control participants, and similarly, 
performance on the CAM could not accurately distinguish between stroke survivors 
and healthy controls. The results suggest that the ToM impairments observed in 
previous neuropsychological studies involving heterogeneous stroke and other types 
of acquired brain injury (e.g., traumatic brain injury) survivors may be attributable to 
the absence of cues reflective of real-world interactions (e.g., motion) in the artificial 
social-perceptual tasks administered, or the use of social-cognitive ToM tasks, which 
are likely to be affected by acquired brain injury due to this aspect of ToM being heavily 
dependent on other cognitive processes (e.g., ability to inhibit self-perspective). Lastly, 
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the exploratory findings of differential ToM deficits (e.g., specific verbal ToM 
impairment, global ToM impairment) point towards a functional fractionation of social-
perceptual ToM abilities, which appear to be dependent on the nature of the perceptual 
cues available to a person (face/visual vs. voice/auditory). Although, given the nature 
of these exploratory findings, this controversial fractionation hypothesis is tentative 
and will need further investigation within lesion studies with greater experimental 
power combined with neuroimaging technology.   
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Appendix I: Analyses to test parametric assumptions of the variables (between-
group comparisons) 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
Group 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
Stroke CAM Voice Correct Rate .132 22 .200* .982 22 .943 
Healthy Control CAM Voice Correct Rate .163 20 .172 .958 20 .510 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
CAM Voice Correct Rate   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
.025 1 40 .875 
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Appendix S: Research Feedback Letter for Participants  
Research Project: Do Executive Functions Partially Underlie Theory of Mind in 
Adults?  
Research Feedback Letter for Participants  
Dear ……………………………………………………, 
Thank you for participating in my research project about the ability to guess what 
other people are thinking and feeling (also known as ‘Theory of Mind’). 
I am writing this letter as a reminder of what we did together and to feedback what 
we found out from the research project. 
The project intended to find out whether difficulties with Theory of Mind abilities 
might be linked to general difficulties with problem-solving. However, the computer 
tasks we developed to test problem-solving did not measure it accurately, so we 
focused on whether people that have had a stroke performed differently to people 
who have not had a stroke on Theory of Mind tasks. We measured Theory of Mind 
using a relatively realistic task (called the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice 
Battery) that required you to guess what actors were thinking or feeling based on a 
short voice or video clip: 
                              
A comparison showed that people that have had a stroke generally performed just 
as well as people that have not had a stroke on the Mindreading Battery. Some 
previous research studies suggest that Theory of Mind is affected by stroke and other 
types of acquired brain injury, whereas there are some studies that suggest this 
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might only be the case for people that have had certain types of stroke. Given our 
findings, we think that some of the previous research that has looked at Theory of 
Mind, has used tasks which are very reliant on other thinking skills that are more 
commonly affected by stroke (e.g., memory or language). We think that the 
demands these tasks place on the other thinking skills might explain why some 
research has found people with stroke generally perform less well on Theory of Mind 
tasks, rather than there being specific difficulties in guessing what other people are 
thinking or feeling. I have suggested that further research is done to find out whether 
performance on realistic Theory of Mind tasks (like the one you completed) relates 
to real-world outcomes, like how comfortable a person is with managing social 
relationships.  
However, looking further into our findings, we found that some people that have 
had a stroke found it easier to guess a person’s thoughts and feelings from their 
voice, rather than from their face. We think this might mean that there are different 
networks in the brain that contribute to Theory of Mind. I have suggested that future 
research is completed to try to pinpoint the brain areas that form this network and 
determine what ways they might be contributing to Theory of Mind.  
I have now written a report based on these findings, which will form part of my 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at Salomons, Canterbury Christ Church University. I 
will also be attempting to publish the report within an academic journal, which will 
contribute to what we know about brain functions and how best to assess these 
abilities for people who experience stroke.  
Thank you very much for participating in my project and helping to further 
contribute to our understanding of Theory of Mind, I hope it was as pleasant an 
experience for you as it was for me.   
If you have any further questions, please do contact me by email on: 
i.o.akande66@canterbury.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can leave a message for me on 
0333 011 7070, and I will get back to you as soon as possible.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
Isaac Akande 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Salomons Centre for Applied Psychology 
Canterbury Christ Church University  
Broomhill Road, Tunbridge Wells 
Kent, TN3 0TF 
142 
SECTION C 
 
  
Appendix T: Guide for Authors Preparing for Manuscript Submission to 
Neuropsychologia   
 
 
The following article types are accepted:  
(a) Research Reports 
(up to 20 printed journal pages or about 17,000 words)  
(b)Reviews and Perspectives 
(up to 30 printed journal pages or 26,000 words). These should also provide critical accounts 
and comprehensive surveys of topics of major current interest within the scope of the journal. 
NEW SUBMISSIONS  
 
Submission to this journal proceeds totally online and you will be guided stepwise through 
the creation and uploading of your files. The system automatically converts your files to a 
single PDF file, which is used in the peer-review process. 
As part of the Your Paper Your Way service, you may choose to submit your manuscript as a 
single file to be used in the refereeing process. This can be a PDF file or a Word document, in 
any format or lay-out that can be used by referees to evaluate your manuscript. It should 
contain high enough quality figures for refereeing. If you prefer to do so, you may still 
provide all or some of the source files at the initial submission. Please note that individual 
figure files larger than 10 MB must be uploaded separately. 
References  
There are no strict requirements on reference formatting at submission. References can be in 
any style or format as long as the style is consistent. Where applicable, author(s) name(s), 
journal title/book title, chapter title/article title, year of publication, volume number/book 
chapter and the pagination must be present. Use of DOI is highly encouraged. The reference 
style used by the journal will be applied to the accepted article by Elsevier at the proof stage. 
Note that missing data will be highlighted at proof stage for the author to correct. 
Formatting requirements  
There are no strict formatting requirements but all manuscripts must contain the essential 
elements needed to convey your manuscript, for example Abstract, Keywords, Introduction, 
Materials and Methods, Results, Conclusions, Artwork and Tables with Captions. 
If your article includes any Videos and/or other Supplementary material, this should be 
included in your initial submission for peer review purposes. 
Divide the article into clearly defined sections. 
Figures and tables embedded in text  
Please ensure the figures and the tables included in the single file are placed next to the 
relevant text in the manuscript, rather than at the bottom or the top of the file. The 
corresponding caption should be placed directly below the figure or table. 
REVISED SUBMISSIONS  
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Use of word processing software  
Regardless of the file format of the original submission, at revision you must provide us with 
an editable file of the entire article. Keep the layout of the text as simple as possible. Most 
formatting codes will be removed and replaced on processing the article. The electronic text 
should be prepared in a way very similar to that of conventional manuscripts (see also the 
Guide to Publishing with Elsevier). See also the section on Electronic artwork.  
To avoid unnecessary errors you are strongly advised to use the 'spell-check' and 'grammar-
check' functions of your word processor. 
Article structure  
Subdivision - numbered sections  
Divide your article into clearly defined and numbered sections. Subsections should be 
numbered 1.1 (then 1.1.1, 1.1.2, ...), 1.2, etc. (the abstract is not included in section 
numbering). Use this numbering also for internal cross-referencing: do not just refer to 'the 
text'. Any subsection may be given a brief heading. Each heading should appear on its own 
separate line. 
Introduction  
State the objectives of the work and provide an adequate background, avoiding a detailed 
literature survey or a summary of the results. 
Material and methods  
Provide sufficient detail to allow the work to be reproduced. Methods already published 
should be indicated by a reference: only relevant modifications should be described. 
Results  
Results should be clear and concise. 
Discussion  
This should explore the significance of the results of the work, not repeat them. A combined 
Results and Discussion section is often appropriate. Avoid extensive citations and discussion 
of published literature. 
Appendices  
If there is more than one appendix, they should be identified as A, B, etc. Formulae and 
equations in appendices should be given separate numbering: Eq. (A.1), Eq. (A.2), etc.; in a 
subsequent appendix, Eq. (B.1) and so on. Similarly for tables and figures: Table A.1; Fig. 
A.1, etc. 
Essential title page information  
 
• Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval systems. Avoid 
abbreviations and formulae where possible. 
• Author names and affiliations. Please clearly indicate the given name(s) and family 
name(s) of each author and check that all names are accurately spelled. Present the authors' 
affiliation addresses (where the actual work was done) below the names. Indicate all 
affiliations with a lower-case superscript letter immediately after the author's name and in 
front of the appropriate address. Provide the full postal address of each affiliation, including 
the country name and, if available, the e-mail address of each author. 
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• Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who will handle correspondence at all stages of 
refereeing and publication, also post-publication. Ensure that the e-mail address is given 
and that contact details are kept up to date by the corresponding author. 
• Present/permanent address. If an author has moved since the work described in the article 
was done, or was visiting at the time, a 'Present address' (or 'Permanent address') may be 
indicated as a footnote to that author's name. The address at which the author actually did the 
work must be retained as the main, affiliation address. Superscript Arabic numerals are used 
for such footnotes. 
Abstract  
 
A concise and factual abstract is required. The abstract should state briefly the purpose of the 
research, the principal results and major conclusions. An abstract is often presented 
separately from the article, so it must be able to stand alone. For this reason, References 
should be avoided, but if essential, then cite the author(s) and year(s). Also, non-standard or 
uncommon abbreviations should be avoided, but if essential they must be defined at their first 
mention in the abstract itself. 
Graphical abstract  
Although a graphical abstract is optional, its use is encouraged as it draws more attention to 
the online article. The graphical abstract should summarize the contents of the article in a 
concise, pictorial form designed to capture the attention of a wide readership. Graphical 
abstracts should be submitted as a separate file in the online submission system. Image size: 
Please provide an image with a minimum of 531 × 1328 pixels (h × w) or proportionally 
more. The image should be readable at a size of 5 × 13 cm using a regular screen resolution 
of 96 dpi. Preferred file types: TIFF, EPS, PDF or MS Office files. You can view Example 
Graphical Abstracts on our information site. 
Authors can make use of Elsevier's Illustration and Enhancement service to ensure the best 
presentation of their images and in accordance with all technical requirements: Illustration 
Service. 
Highlights  
Highlights are mandatory for this journal. They consist of a short collection of bullet points 
that convey the core findings of the article and should be submitted in a separate editable file 
in the online submission system. Please use 'Highlights' in the file name and include 3 to 5 
bullet points (maximum 85 characters, including spaces, per bullet point). You can view 
example Highlights on our information site. 
Keywords  
 
Immediately after the abstract, provide a maximum of 6 keywords, using British spelling and 
avoiding general and plural terms and multiple concepts (avoid, for example, 'and', 'of'). Be 
sparing with abbreviations: only abbreviations firmly established in the field may be eligible. 
These keywords will be used for indexing purposes. 
Acknowledgements  
Collate acknowledgements in a separate section at the end of the article before the references 
and do not, therefore, include them on the title page, as a footnote to the title or otherwise. 
List here those individuals who provided help during the research (e.g., providing language 
help, writing assistance or proof reading the article, etc.). 
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Formatting of funding sources  
List funding sources in this standard way to facilitate compliance to funder's requirements: 
Funding: This work was supported by the National Institutes of Health [grant numbers xxxx, 
yyyy]; the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, WA [grant number zzzz]; and the 
United States Institutes of Peace [grant number aaaa]. 
It is not necessary to include detailed descriptions on the program or type of grants and 
awards. When funding is from a block grant or other resources available to a university, 
college, or other research institution, submit the name of the institute or organization that 
provided the funding. 
If no funding has been provided for the research, please include the following sentence: 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
Footnotes  
Footnotes should be used sparingly. Number them consecutively throughout the article. Many 
word processors build footnotes into the text, and this feature may be used. Should this not be 
the case, indicate the position of footnotes in the text and present the footnotes themselves 
separately at the end of the article. 
Artwork  
Electronic artwork  
General points 
• Make sure you use uniform lettering and sizing of your original artwork.  
• Preferred fonts: Arial (or Helvetica), Times New Roman (or Times), Symbol, Courier.  
• Number the illustrations according to their sequence in the text.  
• Use a logical naming convention for your artwork files.  
• Indicate per figure if it is a single, 1.5 or 2-column fitting image.  
• For Word submissions only, you may still provide figures and their captions, and tables 
within a single file at the revision stage.  
• Please note that individual figure files larger than 10 MB must be provided in separate 
source files. 
A detailed guide on electronic artwork is available. 
You are urged to visit this site; some excerpts from the detailed information are given 
here.  
Formats  
Regardless of the application used, when your electronic artwork is finalized, please 'save as' 
or convert the images to one of the following formats (note the resolution requirements for 
line drawings, halftones, and line/halftone combinations given below):  
EPS (or PDF): Vector drawings. Embed the font or save the text as 'graphics'.  
TIFF (or JPG): Color or grayscale photographs (halftones): always use a minimum of 300 
dpi.  
TIFF (or JPG): Bitmapped line drawings: use a minimum of 1000 dpi.  
TIFF (or JPG): Combinations bitmapped line/half-tone (color or grayscale): a minimum of 
500 dpi is required.  
Please do not:  
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• Supply files that are optimized for screen use (e.g., GIF, BMP, PICT, WPG); the resolution 
is too low.  
• Supply files that are too low in resolution.  
• Submit graphics that are disproportionately large for the content. 
Color artwork  
Please make sure that artwork files are in an acceptable format (TIFF (or JPEG), EPS (or 
PDF), or MS Office files) and with the correct resolution. If, together with your accepted 
article, you submit usable color figures then Elsevier will ensure, at no additional charge, that 
these figures will appear in color online (e.g., ScienceDirect and other sites) regardless of 
whether or not these illustrations are reproduced in color in the printed version. For color 
reproduction in print, you will receive information regarding the costs from Elsevier 
after receipt of your accepted article. Please indicate your preference for color: in print or 
online only. Further information on the preparation of electronic artwork. 
Figure captions  
Ensure that each illustration has a caption. A caption should comprise a brief title (not on the 
figure itself) and a description of the illustration. Keep text in the illustrations themselves to a 
minimum but explain all symbols and abbreviations used. 
Tables  
 
Please submit tables as editable text and not as images. Tables can be placed either next to the 
relevant text in the article, or on separate page(s) at the end. Number tables consecutively in 
accordance with their appearance in the text and place any table notes below the table body. 
Be sparing in the use of tables and ensure that the data presented in them do not duplicate 
results described elsewhere in the article. Please avoid using vertical rules and shading in 
table cells. 
References  
Citation in text  
Please ensure that every reference cited in the text is also present in the reference list (and 
vice versa). Any references cited in the abstract must be given in full. Unpublished results 
and personal communications are not recommended in the reference list, but may be 
mentioned in the text. If these references are included in the reference list they should follow 
the standard reference style of the journal and should include a substitution of the publication 
date with either 'Unpublished results' or 'Personal communication'. Citation of a reference as 
'in press' implies that the item has been accepted for publication. 
Web references  
As a minimum, the full URL should be given and the date when the reference was last 
accessed. Any further information, if known (DOI, author names, dates, reference to a source 
publication, etc.), should also be given. Web references can be listed separately (e.g., after the 
reference list) under a different heading if desired, or can be included in the reference list. 
Data references  
This journal encourages you to cite underlying or relevant datasets in your manuscript by 
citing them in your text and including a data reference in your Reference List. Data 
references should include the following elements: author name(s), dataset title, data 
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repository, version (where available), year, and global persistent identifier. Add [dataset] 
immediately before the reference so we can properly identify it as a data reference. The 
[dataset] identifier will not appear in your published article. 
References in a special issue  
Please ensure that the words 'this issue' are added to any references in the list (and any 
citations in the text) to other articles in the same Special Issue. 
Reference management software  
Most Elsevier journals have their reference template available in many of the most popular 
reference management software products. These include all products that support Citation 
Style Language styles, such as Mendeley and Zotero, as well as EndNote. Using the word 
processor plug-ins from these products, authors only need to select the appropriate journal 
template when preparing their article, after which citations and bibliographies will be 
automatically formatted in the journal's style. If no template is yet available for this journal, 
please follow the format of the sample references and citations as shown in this Guide. 
 
Users of Mendeley Desktop can easily install the reference style for this journal by clicking 
the following link: 
http://open.mendeley.com/use-citation-style/neuropsychologia 
When preparing your manuscript, you will then be able to select this style using the 
Mendeley plug-ins for Microsoft Word or LibreOffice. 
Reference formatting  
There are no strict requirements on reference formatting at submission. References can be in 
any style or format as long as the style is consistent. Where applicable, author(s) name(s), 
journal title/book title, chapter title/article title, year of publication, volume number/book 
chapter and the pagination must be present. Use of DOI is highly encouraged. The reference 
style used by the journal will be applied to the accepted article by Elsevier at the proof stage. 
Note that missing data will be highlighted at proof stage for the author to correct. If you do 
wish to format the references yourself they should be arranged according to the following 
examples: 
Reference style  
Text: All citations in the text should refer to:  
1. Single author: the author's name (without initials, unless there is ambiguity) and the year 
of publication;  
2. Two authors: both authors' names and the year of publication;  
3. Three or more authors: first author's name followed by 'et al.' and the year of publication.  
Citations may be made directly (or parenthetically). Groups of references should be listed 
first alphabetically, then chronologically.  
Examples: 'as demonstrated (Allan, 2000a, 2000b, 1999; Allan and Jones, 1999). Kramer et 
al. (2010) have recently shown ....'  
List: References should be arranged first alphabetically and then further sorted 
chronologically if necessary. More than one reference from the same author(s) in the same 
year must be identified by the letters 'a', 'b', 'c', etc., placed after the year of publication.  
Examples:  
Reference to a journal publication:  
Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J.A.J., Lupton, R.A., 2010. The art of writing a scientific article. 
J. Sci. Commun. 163, 51–59.  
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Reference to a book:  
Strunk Jr., W., White, E.B., 2000. The Elements of Style, fourth ed. Longman, New York.  
Reference to a chapter in an edited book:  
Mettam, G.R., Adams, L.B., 2009. How to prepare an electronic version of your article, in: 
Jones, B.S., Smith , R.Z. (Eds.), Introduction to the Electronic Age. E-Publishing Inc., New 
York, pp. 281–304. 
Reference to a website: 
Cancer Research UK, 1975. Cancer statistics reports for the UK. 
http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/aboutcancer/statistics/cancerstatsreport/ (accessed 
13.03.03). 
Reference to a dataset: 
[dataset] Oguro, M., Imahiro, S., Saito, S., Nakashizuka, T., 2015. Mortality data for 
Japanese oak wilt disease and surrounding forest compositions. Mendeley Data, v1. 
https://doi.org/10.17632/xwj98nb39r.1. 
Video  
 
Elsevier accepts video material and animation sequences to support and enhance your 
scientific research. Authors who have video or animation files that they wish to submit with 
their article are strongly encouraged to include links to these within the body of the article. 
This can be done in the same way as a figure or table by referring to the video or animation 
content and noting in the body text where it should be placed. All submitted files should be 
properly labeled so that they directly relate to the video file's content. In order to ensure that 
your video or animation material is directly usable, please provide the files in one of our 
recommended file formats with a preferred maximum size of 150 MB. Video and animation 
files supplied will be published online in the electronic version of your article in Elsevier 
Web products, including ScienceDirect. Please supply 'stills' with your files: you can choose 
any frame from the video or animation or make a separate image. These will be used instead 
of standard icons and will personalize the link to your video data. For more detailed 
instructions please visit our video instruction pages. Note: since video and animation cannot 
be embedded in the print version of the journal, please provide text for both the electronic 
and the print version for the portions of the article that refer to this content. 
Supplementary material  
 
Supplementary material such as applications, images and sound clips, can be published with 
your article to enhance it. Submitted supplementary items are published exactly as they are 
received (Excel or PowerPoint files will appear as such online). Please submit your material 
together with the article and supply a concise, descriptive caption for each supplementary 
file. If you wish to make changes to supplementary material during any stage of the process, 
please make sure to provide an updated file. Do not annotate any corrections on a previous 
version. Please switch off the 'Track Changes' option in Microsoft Office files as these will 
appear in the published version. 
RESEARCH DATA  
 
This journal encourages and enables you to share data that supports your research publication 
where appropriate, and enables you to interlink the data with your published articles. 
Research data refers to the results of observations or experimentation that validate research 
findings. To facilitate reproducibility and data reuse, this journal also encourages you to share 
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your software, code, models, algorithms, protocols, methods and other useful materials 
related to the project. 
Below are a number of ways in which you can associate data with your article or make a 
statement about the availability of your data when submitting your manuscript. If you are 
sharing data in one of these ways, you are encouraged to cite the data in your manuscript and 
reference list. Please refer to the "References" section for more information about data 
citation. For more information on depositing, sharing and using research data and other 
relevant research materials, visit the research data page. 
Data linking  
If you have made your research data available in a data repository, you can link your article 
directly to the dataset. Elsevier collaborates with a number of repositories to link articles on 
ScienceDirect with relevant repositories, giving readers access to underlying data that give 
them a better understanding of the research described. 
There are different ways to link your datasets to your article. When available, you can 
directly link your dataset to your article by providing the relevant information in the 
submission system. For more information, visit the database linking page. 
For supported data repositories a repository banner will automatically appear next to your 
published article on ScienceDirect. 
In addition, you can link to relevant data or entities through identifiers within the text of your 
manuscript, using the following format: Database: xxxx (e.g., TAIR: AT1G01020; CCDC: 
734053; PDB: 1XFN). 
Open data  
This journal supports Open data, enabling authors to submit any raw (unprocessed) research 
data with their article for open access publication under the CC BY license. More 
information. 
Transparency  
To foster transparency, we encourage you to state the availability of your data in your 
submission. If your data is unavailable to access or unsuitable to post, this gives you the 
opportunity to indicate why. If you submit this form with your manuscript as a supplementary 
file, the statement will appear next to your published article on ScienceDirect. 
ARTICLE ENRICHMENTS  
AudioSlides  
 
The journal encourages authors to create an AudioSlides presentation with their published 
article. AudioSlides are brief, webinar-style presentations that are shown next to the online 
article on ScienceDirect. This gives authors the opportunity to summarize their research in 
their own words and to help readers understand what the paper is about. More information 
and examples are available. Authors of this journal will automatically receive an invitation e-
mail to create an AudioSlides presentation after acceptance of their paper. 
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3D neuroimaging  
 
You can enrich your online articles by providing 3D neuroimaging data in NIfTI format. This 
will be visualized for readers using the interactive viewer embedded within your article, and 
will enable them to: browse through available neuroimaging datasets; zoom, rotate and pan 
the 3D brain reconstruction; cut through the volume; change opacity and color mapping; 
switch between 3D and 2D projected views; and download the data. The viewer supports 
both single (.nii) and dual (.hdr and .img) NIfTI file formats. Recommended size of a single 
uncompressed dataset is maximum 150 MB. Multiple datasets can be submitted. Each dataset 
will have to be zipped and uploaded to the online submission system via the '3D 
neuroimaging data' submission category. Please provide a short informative description for 
each dataset by filling in the 'Description' field when uploading a dataset. Note: all datasets 
will be available for downloading from the online article on ScienceDirect. If you have 
concerns about your data being downloadable, please provide a video instead. More 
information. 
Interactive plots  
 
This journal enables you to show an Interactive Plot with your article by simply submitting a 
data file. Full instructions. 
 
Online proof correction  
 
Corresponding authors will receive an e-mail with a link to our online proofing system, 
allowing annotation and correction of proofs online. The environment is similar to MS Word: 
in addition to editing text, you can also comment on figures/tables and answer questions from 
the Copy Editor. Web-based proofing provides a faster and less error-prone process by 
allowing you to directly type your corrections, eliminating the potential introduction of 
errors. 
If preferred, you can still choose to annotate and upload your edits on the PDF version. All 
instructions for proofing will be given in the e-mail we send to authors, including alternative 
methods to the online version and PDF. 
We will do everything possible to get your article published quickly and accurately. Please 
use this proof only for checking the typesetting, editing, completeness and correctness of the 
text, tables and figures. Significant changes to the article as accepted for publication will only 
be considered at this stage with permission from the Editor. It is important to ensure that all 
corrections are sent back to us in one communication. Please check carefully before replying, 
as inclusion of any subsequent corrections cannot be guaranteed. Proofreading is solely your 
responsibility. 
Offprints  
 
The corresponding author will, at no cost, receive 25 free paper offprints, or alternatively a 
customized Share Link providing 50 days free access to the final published version of the 
article on ScienceDirect. The Share Link can be used for sharing the article via any 
communication channel, including email and social media. For an extra charge, paper 
offprints can be ordered via the offprint order form which is sent once the article is accepted 
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for publication. Both corresponding and co-authors may order offprints at any time via 
Elsevier's Webshop. Corresponding authors who have published their article open access do 
not receive a Share Link as their final published version of the article is available open access 
on ScienceDirect and can be shared through the article DOI link. 
 
 
Visit the Elsevier Support Center to find the answers you need. Here you will find everything 
from Frequently Asked Questions to ways to get in touch. 
You can also check the status of your submitted article or find out when your accepted article 
will be published. 
 
Submission checklist  
 
You can use this list to carry out a final check of your submission before you send it to the 
journal for review. Please check the relevant section in this Guide for Authors for more 
details.  
Ensure that the following items are present: 
One author has been designated as the corresponding author with contact details: 
• E-mail address 
• Full postal address  
All necessary files have been uploaded: 
Manuscript: 
• Include keywords 
• All figures (include relevant captions) 
• All tables (including titles, description, footnotes) 
• Ensure all figure and table citations in the text match the files provided 
• Indicate clearly if color should be used for any figures in print 
Graphical Abstracts / Highlights files (where applicable) 
Supplemental files (where applicable) 
Further considerations 
• Manuscript has been 'spell checked' and 'grammar checked' 
• All references mentioned in the Reference List are cited in the text, and vice versa 
• Permission has been obtained for use of copyrighted material from other sources (including 
the Internet) 
• Relevant declarations of interest have been made 
• Journal policies detailed in this guide have been reviewed 
• Referee suggestions and contact details provided, based on journal requirements  
For further information, visit our Support Center. 
